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PROXY ACCESS AND OPTIMAL
STANDARDIZATION IN CORPORATE
GOVERNANCE: AN EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS
Reilly S. Steel*
ABSTRACT
According to the conventional wisdom, “one size does not fit all” in
corporate governance. Firms are heterogeneous with respect to their
governance needs, implying that the optimal corporate governance
structure must also vary from firm to firm. This one-size-does-not-fitall axiom has featured prominently in arguments against numerous
corporate law regulatory initiatives, including the SEC’s failed Rule
14a-11—an attempt to impose mandatory, uniform “proxy access” on
all public companies—which the D.C. Circuit struck down for
inadequate cost–benefit analysis.
This Article presents an alternative theory as to the role of
standardization in corporate governance—in which investors prefer
standardized terms—and empirical evidence that is consistent with
this theory. Under my theory, shareholders prefer standardization
because they must incur considerable transaction costs to exercise
control rights that contain idiosyncratic terms. Standardization
reduces these transaction costs. Consistent with this theory, I find that
standardization, not heterogeneity, has pervaded the post–Rule 14a11 private ordering of proxy access. Shareholder proposals and
adopted bylaws alike have converged around standardized terms, and
regression analysis suggests that this standardization reflects
shareholder preferences. Moreover, employing a regressiondiscontinuity design, I find evidence indicating that markets have
generally reacted favorably to the passage of these standardized
proposals. However, robustness checks cast some doubt on the
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internal validity of this regression-discontinuity design, and thus these
results should be taken with a grain of salt.
My theory and empirical findings have important implications for
longstanding normative debates in corporate law. With a proper
understanding of the role of standardization in corporate governance,
the one-size-fits-all critique—though not baseless—takes on a
different meaning. Although lawmakers would still do well to retain a
presumption in favor of default rules instead of mandatory rules, the
need for heterogeneity does not appear to be as great as some have
supposed, and lawmakers may benefit from a greater focus on
encouraging optimal standardization instead of optimal
heterogeneity. These insights bear both on optimal regulatory design
in the abstract and on the wisdom of currently pending federal
legislation in a more concrete way.
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INTRODUCTION
According to a chorus of scholars, lawmakers, and practitioners,
regulators should not impose standardized corporate governance
structures on firms because “one size does not fit all.”1 Just as differences
1. See, e.g., Barry D. Baysinger & Henry N. Butler, Race for the Bottom v. Climb
to the Top: The ALI Project and Uniformity in Corporate Law, 10 J. CORP. L. 431, 456
(1985) (claiming “any imposition of uniformity” in corporate law rules “will be Pareto
inefficient”); Lucian Ayre Bebchuk, The Case for Increasing Shareholder Power, 118
HARV. L. REV. 833, 867 (2005) (“Rules chosen by public officials . . . inevitably suffer
from the problem that ‘one size does not fit all.’”); Jeffrey L. Coles et al., Boards: Does
One Size Fit All?, 87 J. FIN. ECON. 329, 351–52 (2008) (presenting evidence that the
shareholder-value effects of board size vary along firm-specific dimensions); Zohar
Goshen & Richard Squire, Principal Costs: A New Theory for Corporate Law and
Governance, 117 COLUM. L. REV. 767, 826 (2017) (“[T]he inescapable tradeoff between
principal costs and agent costs cautions against . . . one-size-fits-all regulations.”); Joseph
A. Grundfest, The SEC’s Proposed Proxy Access Rules: Politics, Economics, and the
Law, 65 BUS. LAW. 361, 371 (2010) (criticizing the SEC’s proposed proxy access rule as
a “one-size-fits-all approach to corporate law”); Letter from Cravath, Swaine & Moore
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in waistlines imply differences in optimal belt sizes, so too do differences
in firm characteristics imply differences in optimal corporate governance
structures. For decades, this one-size-does-not-fit-all critique has featured
prominently in corporate law debates both in the United States and
abroad,2 undergirding criticisms of universal proxy access,3 dual-classshare bans,4 mandatory board structures,5 and a host of other proposed
and adopted rules.6 Moreover, commentators have leveraged the critique
to denounce proxy advisers for offering relatively uniform governance
recommendations 7 and, more generally, to question various private

LLP et al., to Elizabeth Murphy, Sec’y, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n 6–8 (Jan. 19, 2010),
https://www.sec.gov/comments/s7-10-09/s71009-619.pdf [https://perma.cc/4QW4-KPH
6] [hereinafter Seven Law Firms Letter] (leveraging the one-size-fits-all argument to
critique the SEC’s proxy access rule); Letter from Wachtell, Lipton, Rosen & Katz to
Elizabeth M. Murphy, Sec’y, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n 9 (Aug. 17, 2009), https://www.
sec.gov/comments/s7-10-09/s71009-263.pdf [https://perma.cc/3YR5-LTZ5] [hereinafter
Wachtell Letter] (“[A]ny attempt to fashion a single size for all will impose inappropriate
mandates on some companies . . . .”).
2. For an international example analyzing U.K. firms’ decisions to opt out of
specified “best practices,” see Sridhar R. Arcot & Valentina G. Bruno, One Size Does
Not Fit All, After All: Evidence from Corporate Governance (May 16, 2006)
(unpublished manuscript) (on file with the Fordham Journal of Corporate & Financial
Law).
3. See, e.g., Grundfest, supra note 1, at 371.
4. See, e.g., Charles M. Yablon, Innovation, the State and Private Enterprise: A
Corporate Lawyer’s Perspective, 40 DEL. J. CORP. L. 1017, 1058–59 (2016) (reviewing
MARIANA MAZZUCATO, THE ENTREPRENEURIAL STATE: DEBUNKING PUBLIC VS. PRIVATE
SECTOR MYTHS (2014)) (cautioning against “‘one-size-fits-all’ proposals to ban all dual
class structures”).
5. See, e.g., Roberta Romano, The Sarbanes-Oxley Act and the Making of Quack
Corporate Governance, 114 YALE L.J. 1521, 1595–97 (2005).
6. See, e.g., Stephen M. Bainbridge, Dodd-Frank: Quack Federal Corporate
Governance Round II, 95 MINN. L. REV. 1779, 1805 (2011) (lamenting Dodd-Frank’s
imposition of a “one-size-fits-all model . . . on all public companies”); D. Gordon Smith
et al., Private Ordering with Shareholder Bylaws, 80 FORDHAM L. REV. 125, 128 (2011)
(arguing that the interaction between federal and state law has produced a “one-size-fitsall governance structure” characterized “by almost complete reliance on centralized
decision making by directors and officers”).
7. See, e.g., Matthew D. Cain et al., How Corporate Governance Is Made: The Case
of the Golden Leash, 164 U. PA. L. REV. 649, 697 (2016) (arguing “governance
intermediaries’ market-wide pronouncements” that particular governance terms are
“universally harmful (or beneficial)” are “suspect” based on evidence that “one size does
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efforts to effect corporate governance reforms. 8 Indeed, the one-sizedoes-not-fit-all argument underlies currently pending legislation that
would drastically transform the regulatory framework governing proxy
advisers and significantly impact the private ordering of corporate
governance.9
The one-size-fits-all issue is particularly important to the debate
surrounding so-called “proxy access.” Proxy access refers to
shareholders’ rights to place a limited number of board nominees on the
annual corporate ballot, at company expense, instead of undertaking the
expensive process of soliciting proxies themselves.10 Proponents of proxy
access point to its ability to increase directors’ accountability by reducing

not fit all”); Paul Rose, The Corporate Governance Industry, 32 J. CORP. L. 887, 916–19
(2007).
8. See, e.g., Sanjai Bhagat et al., The Promise and Peril of Corporate Governance
Indices, 108 COLUM. L. REV. 1803, 1808 (2008) (criticizing the use of corporate
governance indices for failing to take firm-specific circumstances into account); K.J.
Martijn Cremers et al., Staggered Boards and Long-Term Firm Value, Revisited, J. FIN.
ECON. (forthcoming) (manuscript at 33) (on file with the Fordham Journal of Corporate
& Financial Law) (presenting evidence indicating a “nuanced” relationship between
staggered boards and firm value and challenging “the ‘one-size-fits-all’ policy that favors
the annual election of directors—and which is currently supported by many proxy
advisory firms and other shareholder advocates—as inconsistent with the empirical
evidence on staggered boards”); Martin Lipton & Marshall P. Shaffer, Wachtell Lipton
Discusses Staggered Boards, Long-Term Investments and Long-Term Firm Value,
COLUM. L. SCH.: CLS BLUE SKY BLOG (Dec. 3, 2015), http://clsbluesky.law.columbia.ed
u/2015/12/03/wachtell-lipton-discusses-staggered-boards-long-term-investments-andlong-term-firm-value [https://perma.cc/87JV-MVHH].
9. See infra Section IV.B.2.
10. See HAROLD S. BLOOMENTHAL & SAMUEL WOLFF, 10A INTERNATIONAL
CAPITAL MARKETS AND SECURITIES REGULATION § 25:4, Westlaw (database updated July
2017). Voting at shareholders’ meetings in public corporations is, for all practical
purposes, entirely by proxy, meaning that shareholders vote by giving their proxy to
someone who will attend the meeting and cast votes on their behalf. See Patrick J. Ryan,
Rule 14a-8, Institutional Shareholder Proposals, and Corporate Democracy, 23 GA. L.
REV. 97, 105 (1988). Boards typically send shareholders an official company proxy
statement, which solicits shareholders’ proxies to vote according to the board’s
recommendations. See, e.g., Exelon Corp., Definitive Proxy Statement (Form DEF 14A)
(Mar. 19, 2015). Proxy access requires the company to include a limited number of
shareholder nominees in the company’s own proxy statement—in other words, it gives
shareholders “access” to the proxy statement. See BLOOMENTHAL & WOLFF, supra.
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the costs associated with challenging incumbent directors.11 Meanwhile,
opponents decry its potential to distract directors, encourage specialinterest campaigns, and increase short-termism. 12 In 2009, when the
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) proposed a mandatory proxy
access rule, critics denounced the rule as imposing one-size-fits-all
corporate governance.13 In essence, critics argued that mandated, uniform
proxy access is undesirable because firms’ heterogeneity implies that the
optimal proxy access regime, if any, must vary significantly from firm to
firm. Instead, these critics supported more modest changes permitting
market participants to lobby for proxy access on a firm-by-firm basis
through shareholder proposals. 14 This private ordering, critics posited,
would allow each firm to tailor its proxy access regime to its own unique
circumstances, producing an optimal heterogeneity in terms.15 The rule’s
defenders, by contrast, either ignored these concerns, characterized them
as secondary to the core agency problems that proxy access would
alleviate, or claimed that permitting firms to opt out by structuring proxy
access as a “default” rule should assuage critics’ one-size-fits-all
worries. 16 Both sides of the debate, however, seemed to accept the
premise that corporate governance should vary from firm to firm—what
one might call the “optimal-heterogeneity thesis.”
There are plausible theoretical grounds for supposing that one size
does not fit all in corporate governance. As others argue, one would
expect the economic effect of a given allocation of control rights to differ
by firm according to firm-specific characteristics, implying that the

11. See, e.g., Lucian A. Bebchuk & Scott Hirst, Private Ordering and the Proxy
Access Debate, 65 BUS. LAW. 329, 335–36 (2010).
12. See, e.g., Grundfest, supra note 1, at 378–84; Martin Lipton & Steven A.
Rosenblum, Election Contests in the Company’s Proxy: An Idea Whose Time Has Not
Come, 59 BUS. LAW. 67, 82–84 (2003).
13. See, e.g., Wachtell Letter, supra note 1.
14. See, e.g., Grundfest, supra note 1, at 362–66, 375–76.
15. See, e.g., id.
16. Cf. Bebchuk & Hirst, supra note 11, at 332–36 (proposing an “opt-out” regime);
Letter from Jeff Mahoney, Gen. Counsel, Council of Institutional Inv’rs, to Elizabeth M.
Murphy, Sec’y, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n 1–3 (Aug. 4, 2009), https://www.sec.gov/co
mments/s7-10-09/s71009-78.pdf [https://perma.cc/5WS3-7MGQ] [hereinafter 2009 CII
Letter] (rejecting the one-size-fits-all criticism in favor of a uniform regime). A default
rule is a rule that the law provides as a default but that market participants can change by
“opting out” or tailoring its terms. See Bebchuk & Hirst, supra note 11, at 332–33.
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optimal corporate governance regime must also vary from firm to firm.17
However, as prior empirical research demonstrates, there is often
uniformity in corporate contracting, 18 which lies in tension with the
optimal-heterogeneity thesis. If one size does not fit all, why do firms so
frequently adopt corporate contracts with standardized terms?
This Article presents an alternative theory as to the role of
standardization in corporate governance—in which investors frequently
prefer standardized terms—and empirical evidence that is consistent with
this theory. 19 According to my theory, investors prefer standardization
because there are transaction costs associated with using the control rights
they possess. Before using a control right, an investor must determine its
scope, mechanics, and application to her circumstances; accordingly, a
diversified investor may rationally prefer that the terms of a control right
are identical to those of other firms in her portfolio. With standardized
terms, the investor faces reduced costs of acquiring and processing the
information necessary to exercise the right, which—to the extent that use
of the control right efficiently reduces agency costs—increases
shareholder value. Standardization may thus be a second-best solution in
a world beset by considerable transaction costs.
To test this theory empirically, I examine the private ordering of
proxy access that has followed the D.C. Circuit’s 2011 opinion in
Business Roundtable v. SEC, which vacated the SEC’s final proxy access
rule (Rule 14a-11) but left in place changes that permit private parties to
lobby for proxy access on a firm-by-firm basis.20 In the wake of Business
Roundtable, investors have submitted hundreds of shareholder proposals
requesting proxy access bylaws, and many boards have agreed to

17.
18.

See Goshen & Squire, supra note 1, at 771.
See generally Marcel Kahan & Michael Klausner, Standardization and
Innovation in Corporate Contracting (Or “The Economics of Boilerplate”), 83 VA. L.
REV. 713 (1997).
19. See infra Part II.
20. See Bus. Roundtable v. SEC, 647 F.3d 1144, 1148 (D.C. Cir. 2011). To my
knowledge, there have been only two other empirical studies that consider the post–
Business Roundtable private ordering of proxy access. See infra Section I.B.2. However,
neither study delves into the details of the shareholder proposals’ terms or employs a
regression-discontinuity design to estimate the effect of these proposals on shareholder
value. Moreover, neither study situates the private ordering of proxy access in a
theoretical framework like that developed in this Article.
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implement some version of proxy access.21 If the optimal-heterogeneity
thesis is correct, then shareholders should not exhibit a preference for
standardized terms, and we should observe a diversity in terms among
those proxy access bylaws that firms adopt.
Leveraging a hand-collected dataset, I show that private ordering has
not produced the heterogeneity in terms that some commentators
predicted. 22 In each of three groups—those shareholder proposals that
make it to a vote, those proposals that pass, and the bylaws that boards
actually implement—the major terms of these proposed and adopted
proxy access regimes have been remarkably homogeneous. 23 To the
extent that heterogeneity exists, it has generally manifested only in
choices about whether a firm should adopt proxy access at all—and not
in the terms of the proxy access provisions that firms in fact adopt. 24
Moreover, multivariate regression analysis of shareholder proposal vote
outcomes suggests that investors prefer it this way: standardization in
proposal terms is associated with significantly higher shareholder
support.25 In my preferred specification, the presence of a standard “3/3”
proposal is associated with a nearly thirty-point increase in the percentage
of votes cast “for” the proposal, and the presence of additional
standardized details is associated with another nine percentage points in
support. 26 These results are consistent with a transaction-cost-based
theory of investors’ preference for standardized corporate governance.
Despite shareholders’ apparent preference for standardized terms,
however, it is still possible that the individuals making the voting
decisions—generally agents who are not the ultimate beneficiaries of the
shares they vote—may be inefficiently voting for standardization. One
might instead place more faith in the opinions of those actually pricing
the firms’ securities—those voting with their money, so to speak. I
therefore employ a regression-discontinuity design, which estimates the
causal effect of a standardized proposal’s narrow passage on cumulative
abnormal returns surrounding the vote-disclosure date, to assess market
reactions to “close call” votes. 27 This regression-discontinuity design
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.

See infra Section III.B.
See infra Part III.
See infra Section III.B.
See infra Section III.B.
See infra Section III.C.
See infra Table 2.
See infra Section III.D.
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indicates that a “pass” produces mean cumulative abnormal returns of 335
basis points28—implying that for those firms at which the vote is a close
call, a pass increases the value of a firm’s common stock by an average
of 3.35%. These results are statistically significant and hold across
different asset-pricing models.29 There is, however, some weak evidence
of vote-outcome manipulation around the majority threshold, which casts
some doubt on a critical identification assumption that agents cannot
perfectly sort themselves onto one side or the other of the cutoff point.30
Additionally, the coefficients are not statistically significant in robustness
checks that use alternative methodology. 31 Overall, I interpret these
results as providing weak evidence that the market has welcomed this
standardized proxy access.
My theory and empirical analysis have important implications for
corporate law and policy.32 To begin, a mandatory rule regarding proxy
access—either in favor or against—seems undesirable. 33 But more
importantly, my analysis has broader implications beyond proxy access.
As a purely descriptive matter, private ordering has not avoided the onesize-fits-all phenomenon.34 To the extent there has been heterogeneity in
terms, this heterogeneity has manifested only in investors’ acceptance of
standardized proxy access in some instances and rejection of proxy access
altogether in others—resulting in a numerus clausus–like menu of options
instead of an abundance of individualized, tailored provisions. 35 For
cynics who believe that this level of standardization is likely to be
suboptimal, this should be troubling. But as my theory and the evidence
suggest, there are good reasons to believe that this standardization may in
fact have positive effects. Thus, perhaps one size does not fit all, but a
limited variety of sizes is enough. Accordingly, while lawmakers should
still take care to ensure that private actors are afforded some degree of
flexibility, an emphasis on avoiding one-size-fits-all regulation seems
misplaced. Instead, lawmakers may benefit from focusing more on the
content of the standardized terms that they promulgate—while still
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.

See infra Table 3.
See infra Table 3.
See infra Section III.D.
See infra Section III.D.
See infra Part IV.
See infra Section IV.A.
See infra Section IV.B.
See infra Section IV.B.1.
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retaining a presumption in favor of allowing market participants to alter
these rules.
Despite the “failure” of private ordering to produce great
heterogeneity in the terms of proxy access, there may be at least one
benefit generated by private ordering: optimal standardization. 36
Although the proxy access provisions that firms have adopted closely
resemble the SEC’s failed Rule 14a-11 in many respects, they depart in
one significant way: the addition of aggregation limits. Judging by the
failure of “fix-it” proposals targeting those aggregation limits,
shareholders appear to have accepted these aggregation limits, possibly
as a means to ensure that would-be activists obtain the consent of at least
some long-term blockholders. This analysis has implications for the
longstanding debate among scholars about public versus private provision
of corporate law 37 : firms’ adoption of aggregation limits (and
shareholders’ apparent preference for these terms) suggests that private
provision may have some advantages after all.38 Thus, to the extent that
there are reasons for regulatory changes, regulators should supplement
existing forms of lawmaking (such as traditional notice-and-comment
rulemaking) with data-driven, market-based insights. 39 However, one
cannot rule out the possibility that blockholders have inefficiently favored
aggregation limits to cement their own power, underscoring the need for
future research.
In addition to these theoretical and big-picture issues, this Article
also provides perspective on concrete policy issues regarding currently
pending federal legislation. Among other things, the controversial
Financial CHOICE Act (the CHOICE Act) includes provisions that would
(1) drastically restrict shareholders’ ability to bring resolutions under the
SEC’s shareholder proposal rule and (2) subject proxy advisory firms to
significant additional SEC oversight. 40 My findings provide a basis to
question some of the arguments underlying these legislative proposals.41
The remainder of the Article proceeds in four parts. Part I provides
an overview of the proxy access debate, regulatory and institutional
36.
37.

See infra Section IV.B.1.
See generally Gillian Hadfield & Eric Talley, On Public Versus Private
Provision of Corporate Law, 22 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 414 (2006).
38. See infra Section IV.B.2.
39. See infra Section IV.B.2.
40. See Financial CHOICE Act of 2017, H.R. 10, 115th Cong. §§ 481–483, 844 (1st
Sess. 2017).
41. See infra Section IV.B.
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details, and prior empirical research. Part II offers a theory as to why
investors might prefer standardization in corporate governance. Part III,
the heart of the Article, presents the results of my empirical analysis.
Finally, Part IV discusses implications for law and policy. A brief
conclusion follows.
I. THE PROXY ACCESS DEBATE
Proxy access has long been the subject of considerable debate. Since
in the 1940s, proxy access has appeared on the SEC agenda several
times,42 with the SEC abandoning the idea each time until 2011, when the
agency finally promulgated Rule 14a-11 43 : a mandatory, universally
applicable proxy access rule, which the D.C. Circuit later invalidated for
inadequate cost–benefit analysis. 44 This Part provides background on
proxy access, including the invalidated SEC rule and relevant prior
empirical research. Section I.A provides a brief overview of proxy access,
the rise and fall of Rule 14a-11, and some of the key issues implicated by
the debate over Rule 14a-11. Section I.B reviews the prior empirical
literature.
A. PROXY ACCESS AND THE RISE AND FALL OF RULE 14A-11
An exhaustive account of the long history of proxy access is beyond
the scope of this Article.45 However, proxy access’s more recent history,
including the SEC’s failed rule, may put in perspective the subsequent
private ordering. This section therefore provides a brief overview of proxy
access as a governance tool, the SEC’s failed rule, and the debate over
whether market participants should be allowed to tailor proxy access
through private ordering.

42. See Marcel Kahan & Edward Rock, The Insignificance of Proxy Access, 97 VA.
L. REV. 1347, 1353–57 (2011).
43. Facilitating Shareholder Director Nominations, 75 Fed. Reg. 56, 668 (Sept. 16,
2010) (codified at 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-11 (2010)), vacated by, Bus. Roundtable v. SEC,
647 F.3d 1144, 1156 (D.C. Cir. 2011).
44. See Bus. Roundtable, 647 F.3d at 1149–51.
45. See generally Kahan & Rock, supra note 42, at 1353–57.
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1. Proxy Voting and Proxy Access
Under state law, shareholders generally have the right to nominate
board candidates at the annual shareholders’ meeting.46 However, at the
large public corporations that drive the U.S. economy, proxy voting has
effectively replaced the annual meeting as the channel through which
votes are decided.47 Thus, if a shareholder wishes to challenge incumbent
directors by nominating her own candidates, she must expend
considerable resources to solicit other shareholders’ proxies and convince
them to support her candidate—with one estimate suggesting that the
average “proxy contest” costs the challenger nearly $11 million.48
Many scholars and commentators, viewing shareholders’ ability to
challenge incumbent directors as an important accountability mechanism,
have called for “proxy access” rules that require boards to include
shareholder nominees in the companies’ annual proxy statements, at
company expense.49 By shifting some of the costs associated with proxy
contests to companies instead of shareholders, proxy access could make
it easier for shareholders to hold boards accountable, and thereby reduce
the agency costs produced by the classic separation between ownership
and control.50
Proxy access would, however, likely produce costs as well. As
skeptics argue, proxy access may distract boards, allow special interests
46. See 5 WILLIAM MEADE FLETCHER, FLETCHER CYCLOPEDIA OF THE LAW OF
CORPORATIONS § 2017, Westlaw (database updated Sept. 2016) (noting that shareholders
may typically elect a candidate “through ‘write-ins’ on the ballot,” though courts have
upheld bylaws requiring advance notice).
47. Ryan, supra note 10, at 105. “Proxy voting” refers to voting in which the voter
gives another shareholder her “proxy” to vote for her at the meeting, often with a specific
set of voting instructions. See supra text accompanying note 10.
48. See Nickolay M. Gantchev, The Costs of Shareholder Activism: Evidence from
a Sequential Decision Model 36 (Dec. 21, 2011) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation,
University of Pennsylvania), http://repository.upenn.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=15
73&context=edissertations [https://perma.cc/UJ35-D5C9].
49. See, e.g., Bebchuk & Hirst, supra note 11.
50. See generally ADOLPH A. BERLE, JR. & GARDINER C. MEANS, THE MODERN
CORPORATION AND PRIVATE PROPERTY (1933) (describing the modern corporation as
afflicted by a problematic “separation of ownership and control”); Michael C. Jensen &
William H. Meckling, Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs and
Ownership Structure, 3 J. FIN. ECON. 305 (1976) (providing the canonical exposition of
the role of “agency costs” in the theory of the firm).
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to extract private benefits, and increase short-termism.51 In other words,
just as proxy access may reduce agency costs, it may also increase what
Professors Zohar Goshen and Richard Squire call “principal costs.”52
2. Rule 14a-11 and the Debate over Private Ordering
Under U.S. corporate and securities law, proxy access is neither a
mandatory rule nor a default rule. In fact, until recently, federal securities
law prohibited shareholders from utilizing the federal shareholder
proposal rule—the primary means of shareholder-initiated private
ordering in corporate governance—to lobby for proxy access even on a
firm-by-firm basis. 53 But in 2009, after multiple failed attempts to
institute proxy access dating back to the 1940s, the SEC finally proposed
a proxy access rule with the potential to stick.54
As proposed, Rule 14a-11 required public companies to include in
their annual proxy statements, at company expense, nominees from
certain qualifying shareholders. 55 Under the proposed rule, nominators
had to satisfy tiered minimum-ownership requirements: large accelerated
filers had to own 1% of the firm’s outstanding stock, accelerated filers
had to own 3%, and nonaccelerated filers had to own 5%.56 Meanwhile,
the proposed rule required the nominator to hold this amount of stock for
at least one year, limited nominations at up to 25% of the board, and
allowed unlimited aggregation of shares for the purpose of satisfying the
ownership requirements.57 Additionally, the SEC proposed amending the
shareholder proposal rule’s “relates to an election” exclusion (Rule 14a8(i)(8)), which at the time permitted companies to exclude shareholder
proposals that request proxy access. 58 The amendments to Rule 14a-

51.
52.
53.

See, e.g., Grundfest, supra note 1.
See generally Goshen & Squire, supra note 1.
See 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-8(i)(8) (2010) (permitting firms to exclude shareholder
proposals that “relate[] to . . . a procedure for” the nomination or election of directors).
54. Facilitating Shareholder Director Nominations, 74 Fed. Reg. 29,024 (June 18,
2009) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-11).
55. See id. at 29,035.
56. Id.
57. See id. at 29,035, 29,039, 29,043.
58. See id. at 29,055–56; see also 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-8(i)(8) (2010) (identifying a
proposal’s relation to a “procedure” as grounds for exclusion).
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8(i)(8) would permit shareholders to lobby for proxy access on a firm-byfirm basis.59
The proposed Rule 14a-11 generated considerable debate, including
over 600 comment letters. 60 While both supporters and critics of the
proposed rule generally expressed support for the amendments to Rule
14a-8(i)(8),61 commentators were sharply divided over whether the SEC
should promulgate (1) a mandatory proxy access rule,62 (2) a default rule
in favor of proxy access (an “opt-out” regime), 63 or (3) a default rule
against proxy access (an “opt-in” regime).64
At the heart of this debate were two issues that have long been central
to corporate law. First, many commentators expressed concern with the
imposition of “one-size-fits-all” corporate law. 65 As Professor Joseph
Grundfest put it, the SEC’s “standardized, mandatory form of proxy
59.
60.

See 74 Fed. Reg. at 29,055–56.
Comments on Proposed Rule: Facilitating Shareholder Director Nominations,
U.S. SEC. & EXCHANGE COMMISSION, http://www.sec.gov/comments/s7-10-09/s71009.h
tml [https://perma.cc/55AE-VLCK] (last modified Nov. 11, 2010).
61. See, e.g., Letter from Lucian A. Bebchuk, William J. Friedman and Alicia
Townsend Friedman Professor of Law, Econs., and Fin., Harvard Law Sch., & Scott
Hirst, Co-Exec. Dir., Program on Corp. Governance, Harvard Law Sch., to Elizabeth M.
Murphy, Sec’y, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n (Jan. 19, 2010), https://www.sec.gov/com
ments/s7-10-09/s71009-604.pdf [https://perma.cc/CR3G-2NR9]; Seven Law Firms
Letter, supra note 1; Broc Romanek, Parsing the Proxy Access Comment Letters,
THECORPORATECOUNSEL.NET (Oct. 1, 2009), http://www.thecorporatecounsel.net/blog/
2009/10/with-the-comment-letter.html [https://perma.cc/4PLC-WUN5].
62. See, e.g., 2009 CII Letter, supra note 16 (supporting a “uniform baseline” with
shareholders retaining the option to pursue “a stronger proxy access mechanism” through
private ordering); Letter from Jonathan D. Urick, Analyst, Council of Institutional Inv’rs,
to Elizabeth M. Murphy, Sec’y, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, 1 (Jan. 14, 2010),
https://www.sec.gov/comments/s7-10-09/s71009-592.pdf [https://perma.cc/FKG9SKB3] [hereinafter Jan. 2010 CII Letter] (preferring a “uniform” rule over both opt-in
and opt-out versions).
63. See, e.g., Bebchuk & Hirst, supra note 11.
64. See, e.g., Grundfest, supra note 1.
65. Seven Law Firms Letter, supra note 1, at 6–7 (questioning the wisdom of a
uniform, “one-size-fits-all” standard); see, e.g., Letter from Alexander M. Cutler,
Chairman & Chief Exec. Officer, Eaton Corp., and Chair, Corp. Leadership Initiative,
Bus. Roundtable, to Elizabeth M. Murphy, Sec’y, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n 45 (Aug.
17, 2009), https://www.sec.gov/comments/s7-10-09/s71009-267.pdf [https://perma.cc/
6K6L-4MJR] [hereinafter Business Roundtable Letter] (praising “the opportunity that
state law affords to tailor a system of proxy access to the needs of the individual
company”).
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access” was a “one-size-fits-all approach to corporate law”66—evidently
a bad thing due to the “wide variety of circumstances” in which firms
operate.67 In other words, firms’ heterogeneity implies that the optimal
proxy access regime, if any, must vary significantly from firm to firm.
Thus, while a 3% ownership requirement may be appropriate for some
firms, a 5% ownership requirement might be appropriate for others—and
for others still, a 10% ownership requirement might be appropriate. Legal
scholars have, across many areas in corporate law, long leveraged this
one-size-does-not-fit-all argument, 68 although some scholars have
expressed a degree of skepticism. 69 The rule’s defenders, by contrast,
apparently believed the likely reduction in agency costs that would
accompany proxy access outweighed such concerns.70
Second, some critics doubted the SEC’s ability to determine the
optimal rule (whether mandatory or default). 71 In Grundfest’s words,
designing the right rule would be “a very difficult, highly technical task”
that the SEC is ill equipped to take up.72 If the first issue boils down to
the reach and content of the law, then this second issue essentially boils
down to who should design the law: public or private decisionmakers?
66.
67.

Grundfest, supra note 1, at 371.
Grundfest, supra note 1, at 372 n.44 (quoting Letter from James L. Holzman,
Chair, Council of the Corp. Law Section, Del. State Bar Ass’n, to Elizabeth M. Murphy,
Sec’y, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n 5 (July 24, 2009) (internal quotations marks omitted),
http://www.sec.gov/comments/s7-10-09/s71009-65.pdf [https://perma.cc/UM2Y-4B2D]
[hereinafter DE Bar Letter]).
68. See supra note 1 and accompanying text.
69. See, e.g., Michal Barzuza, Do Heterogeneous Firms Select Their Right “Size” of
Corporate Governance Arrangements? (2017) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with the
Fordham Journal of Corporate & Financial Law) (critiquing the one-size-does-not-fitall argument on the grounds that firms do not necessarily choose their right “size”);
Bebchuk & Hirst, supra note 11, at 334–35, 349–50 (arguing the one-size-fits-all critique
does not lead to the conclusion that a “no-access default” is “optimal”).
70. It is difficult to ascertain the precise rationale of those who supported a
mandatory rule. However, Bebchuk and Hirst, who supported a sort of “sticky default”
in favor of proxy access, cited empirical evidence tending to show that insulating
directors from accountability reduces firm value and performance and the difficulty of
opting out of value-enhancing rules that favor boards relative to value-enhancing rules
that disfavor boards. See Bebchuk & Hirst, supra note 11, at 335–38, 359. These are
essentially agency cost rationales. See generally Jensen & Meckling, supra note 50.
71. See, e.g., Grundfest, supra note 1, at 366 (questioning the SEC’s ability to “guess
at the appropriate default rule”).
72. Id.
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Apparently believing that the latter would be better candidates for the job,
Grundfest and others suggested an opt-in approach or, failing that, using
“a stratified random sample of shareholder preferences” to set the “default
rule.”73 Again, scholars have long debated (and will likely continue to
debate) the deeper issue here—who should design corporate law and
governance—beyond the proxy access context.74
Ultimately, the SEC promulgated a mandatory rule with a 3%
ownership threshold, three-year holding period, 25% maximum slate, and
no aggregation limits.75 Unlike the proposed rule, the final Rule 14a-11
was to apply uniformly to all public companies.76 However, Rule 14a-11
never got the chance to get off the ground. Before it could become
effective, industry groups Business Roundtable and the U.S. Chamber of
Commerce challenged the rule in the D.C. Circuit, and the SEC stayed the
rule’s effectiveness pending the outcome of the court’s decision.77 Several
months later, the D.C. Circuit vacated Rule 14a-11 for inadequate cost–
benefit analysis, dooming the SEC’s attempt at mandatory proxy access.78
The court did not, however, vacate the amendment to Rule 14a-8(i)(8),79
opening the door to private ordering.
B. PRIOR EMPIRICAL LITERATURE ON PROXY ACCESS
To date, there have been several empirical studies of proxy access
in the United States, related to both Rule 14a-11 and private ordering that
73. Id.; see also Business Roundtable Letter, supra note 65; DE Bar Letter, supra
note 67; Seven Law Firms Letter, supra note 1.
74. See, e.g., Hadfield & Talley, supra note 37 (presenting a model in which “private
provision of corporate law” is more efficient than “public provision of corporate law”);
cf. Lucian A. Bebchuk & Robert J. Jackson, Jr., Shining Light on Corporate Political
Spending, 101 GEO. L.J. 923, 947–49 (2013) (arguing that disclosure of corporate
political spending “should not be left to private ordering”). Recent empirical work on the
corporate opportunity doctrine has also engaged with this issue. See Gabriel Rauterberg
& Eric Talley, Contracting Out of the Fiduciary Duty of Loyalty: An Empirical Analysis
of Corporate Opportunity Waivers, 117 COLUM. L. REV. 1075, 1119–28 (2017).
75. Facilitating Shareholder Director Nominations, 75 Fed. Reg. 56, 668, 56-674–
77 (Sept. 16, 2010) (codified at 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-11 (2010)), vacated by, Bus.
Roundtable v. SEC, 647 F.3d 1144, 1156 (D.C. Cir. 2011).
76. Id. at 56,688–91.
77. Bus. Roundtable v. SEC, 647 F.3d 1144, 1148 (D.C. Cir. 2011).
78. Id. at 1153, 1156.
79. Id. at 1153. The petitioners did not challenge this amendment. See id.
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has followed Business Roundtable. This section reviews this literature.
Overall, the evidence is mixed as to both Rule 14a-11 and the post–
Business Roundtable private ordering.
1. The Rule 14a-11 Literature
There are several published studies related to Rule 14a-11, each
employing some version of an event-study design to assess the effect of
proxy access on shareholder value. 80 On balance, these studies offer
mixed results as to the value of the rule. While three studies purport to
find evidence that Rule 14a-11 would have hurt shareholders,81 another
three studies claim to find that Rule 14a-11 would have benefited
shareholders.82
The indeterminacy of this prior literature is likely due to several
factors. First, market-wide event studies run a high risk of producing
results that are confounded by other, unrelated events. This risk is
particularly pronounced for corporate governance studies because of the
potential for macroeconomic events to exert a much greater influence on
stock returns. This risk becomes even more acute if the market partially
anticipates and has therefore already priced (partially or fully) the

80. Event studies measure stock-market reactions to corporate events. See generally
S.P. Kothari & Jerold B. Warner, Econometrics of Event Studies, in 1 HANDBOOK OF
CORPORATE FINANCE 3 (B. Espen Eckbo ed., 2007). Assuming appropriate methodology
and some version of the efficient capital markets hypothesis (ECMH), an event study
permits the researcher to infer the average effect of the event on shareholder value. See
generally id. Here, the event studies examine announcements that reflect either an
increased or a decreased likelihood that Rule 14a-11 (or some version of Rule 14a-11)
would become effective.
81. See Ali C. Akyol et al., Shareholders in the Boardroom: Wealth Effects of the
SEC’s Proposal to Facilitate Director Nominations, 47 J. FIN. & QUANTITATIVE
ANALYSIS 1029, 1030 (2012); David F. Larcker et al., The Market Reaction to Corporate
Governance Regulation, 101 J. FIN. ECON. 431, 432–33 (2011); Thomas Stratmann &
J.W. Verret, Does Shareholder Proxy Access Damage Share Value in Small Publicly
Traded Companies?, 64 STAN. L. REV. 1431, 1459–65 (2012).
82. See Bo Becker et al., Does Shareholder Proxy Access Improve Firm Value?
Evidence from the Business Roundtable’s Challenge, 56 J.L. & ECON. 127, 129 (2013);
Joanna Tochmann Campbell et al., Shareholder Influence Over Director Nomination via
Proxy Access: Implications for Agency Conflict and Stakeholder Value, 33 STRATEGIC
MGMT. J. 1431, 1444 (2012); Jonathan B. Cohn et al., On Enhancing Shareholder
Control: A (Dodd-) Frank Assessment of Proxy Access, 71 J. FIN. 1623, 1624 (2016).
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announcement. 83 Second, one might reasonably interpret some of the
authors’ chosen events to have the opposite effects on the likelihood of
proxy access as those envisioned by the studies. 84 Third, some of the
studies base their conclusions on cross-sectional variation in returns,
which depends on questionable assumptions about which firms are likely
to be targets for proxy access nominations.85

83. This may have occurred for several of the events used in the Rule 14a-11
literature. For example, there is reason to doubt Stratmann and Verret’s claim that the
market anticipated an exemption for firms with a market capitalization of under $75
million: this information arguably leaked prior to the event date when an article reported
that the SEC abandoned the proposed rule’s tiered structure in favor of a uniform 3%
ownership threshold. Kara Scannell, SEC Set to Open Up Proxy Access, WALL STREET J.
(Aug. 5, 2010), http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424052748704741904575409680
246527908 [https://perma.cc/LYT6-LB6P]. Although the article did not specifically
mention any exemption, one might reasonably infer its absence based on the article’s
characterization of the final rule as “an across-the-board 3% rule follow[ing] a
recommendation by the Council of Institutional Investors.” Id. An “across-the-board”
rule would presumably not contain an exemption, and the Council of Institutional
Investors (CII) repeatedly stressed the need for uniformity in their comment letters. See,
e.g., Jan. 2010 CII Letter, supra note 62, at 1; see also Becker et al., supra note 82, at
137–38 (criticizing other prior studies for containing events that were “widely
anticipated, confounded, . . . and/or not meaningful”).
84. For example, some of the studies describe legislative developments related to the
adoption of section 112 of the Delaware General Corporation Law as decreasing the
likelihood of proxy access. See Akyol et al., supra note 81, at 1036 tbl.1; Larcker et al.,
supra note 81, at 436 tbl.1. But section 112 simply clarified that proxy access bylaws are
permissible under Delaware law. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 112 (West 2017). It seems
dubious that informed market participants would perceive section 112 as decreasing the
likelihood that the SEC would pass its own proxy access rule. Federal law, after all,
preempts state law. See U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2. If anything, the developments merely
affirmed shareholders’ ability to lobby for proxy access regardless of the outcome of any
SEC rulemaking—an increase in the likelihood that at least some firms would adopt
proxy access.
85. Two of the studies find a greater response to the events in question among firms
with a greater activist presence. See Becker et al., supra note 82, at 148 tbl.4; Cohn et al.,
supra note 82, at 1649–54. However, these results are somewhat puzzling. As Professors
Kahan and Rock explain, it seems unlikely that activist hedge funds—who appear to
comprise the bulk of activist investors measured in both studies—would make much use
of proxy access. See Kahan & Rock, supra note 42, at 1376 (noting activist hedge funds’
relatively short investment horizons imply they would be unlikely to satisfy Rule 14a11’s three-year holding period).

2017]

PROXY ACCESS AND OPTIMAL
STANDARDIZATION IN CORPORATE GOVERNANCE

191

2. The Post–Business Roundtable Private Ordering Literature
Two empirical studies consider the post–Business Roundtable
private ordering of proxy access under Rule 14a-8, again leveraging
event-study designs. These studies find mixed evidence about this
experiment in private ordering.
One study, by Professors John Matsusaka, Oguzhan Ozbas, and Irene
Yi, examines market reactions to SEC no-action letter decisions 86 for
shareholder proposals generally, including proxy access proposals
specifically.87 They find that grants of no-action relief are associated with
positive abnormal returns,88 which holds for proxy access as well.89 In
general, denials of no-action relief generally remain positive but lose their
statistical significance,90 while in the proxy access context, the signs on
the coefficients are mixed (and statistically insignificant). 91 Based on
these findings, Matsusaka and his coauthors conclude that managers
appear to resist shareholder proposals to protect shareholder value (rather
than extract private benefits) and that some uses of the shareholder
proposal rule harm shareholders.92
However, there are at least two limitations to their analysis. First, the
premise that the market does not anticipate no-action letter outcomes is
questionable. As I have shown in prior research, no-action letters can
follow a predictable, rule-like pattern.93 If one assumes some version of
the efficient capital markets hypothesis (ECMH)—as an event study
must—then one would expect the market to catch on to these patterns and
86. A no-action letter is an informal opinion by the SEC staff, issued in response to
a request by management to exclude a shareholder proposal from its proxy statement,
that the company may or may not exclude the proposal from its annual proxy statement.
See generally Reilly S. Steel, Note, The Underground Rulification of the Ordinary
Business Operations Exclusion, 116 COLUM. L. REV. 1547, 1551–55 (2016) (explaining
the SEC process for issuing no-action letters under Rule 14a-8).
87. John G. Matsusaka et al., Can Shareholder Proposals Hurt Shareholders?
Evidence from SEC No-Action Letter Decisions 2 (Univ. of S. Cal. Ctr. for Law & Soc.
Sci., Law and Economics Research Paper No. CLASS17-4), https://ssrn.com/abstract=28
81408 [https://perma.cc/74ZN-29JF].
88. See id. at 14, tbl.4.
89. See id. at 19, tbl.6.
90. See id. at 15, tbl.4.
91. See id. at 18, tbl.6.
92. See id. at 6–7.
93. See Steel, supra note 86, at 1564–72.
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anticipate the bulk of no-action letter outcomes. Second, Matsusaka and
his coauthors’ evidence is equally consistent with the theory that the SEC
staff has been doing a good job, from a shareholder-value perspective, in
deciding which proposals are excludable. 94 This explanation is also
consistent with the generally positive signs on abnormal returns for both
grants and denials of no-action relief.
The other study, by SEC economist Tara Bhandari and Professors
Peter Iliev and Jonathan Kalodimos, examines several issues related to
the private ordering of proxy access. 95 Two findings are particularly
relevant here. First, the authors find mean abnormal returns of fifty-three
basis points across the seventy-five firms targeted by the New York City
Comptroller’s Boardroom Accountability Project (BAP), using the
project’s announcement as the event window. 96 This, they conclude,
implies that on average, proxy access created shareholder value in the
targeted firms. 97 Second, they find a convergence over time toward
proposals with a three-percent ownership threshold and three-year
holding period, and in regressions with vote outcomes as the dependent
variable and ownership measures as covariates, they find that the presence
of “3/3” terms is associated with greater shareholder support.98 Based on
this “lack of tailoring,” they infer “an imperfect solution to the collective
action problem” due to the costs associated with determining which terms
are appropriate for each company.99 Speculating that “the optimal terms
of access would vary across firms with, for example, different ownership
94. Although “shareholder value” is not an explicit criterion on which to base
excludability determinations, it is plausible (and, hopefully, probable) that the Rule 14a8 exclusions are generally designed to promote shareholder value. Additionally, it is
expected that a well-advised shareholder will draft proposals that are not excludable. It
is therefore plausible that excludability determinations are ultimately attributable to
proponent characteristics, including the proponent’s information and even intelligence.
If a proponent’s poor information or intelligence leads them to submit value-destructive
proposals, then this would present a potential confounding variable.
95. Tara Bhandari et al., Governance Changes Through Shareholder Initiatives: The
Case of Proxy Access (Jan. 17, 2017) (unpublished manuscript), https://ssrn.com/abstract
=2635695 [https://perma.cc/L76G-F736].
96. Id. at 11–12.
97. See id. at 13.
98. See id. at 43 tbl.8, 23. These specifications also include controls for whether the
firm was targeted by the BAP, whether the firm was previously targeted, firm size, and
industry and year fixed effects.
99. Id. at 4–5.
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structures,” they pejoratively describe the trend toward standardization as
a “one-size-fits-all” solution.100 In other words, they appear to accept the
optimal-heterogeneity premise and view the trend toward standardization
as an unfortunate byproduct of the costs of designing proposals.101
The Bhandari, Iliev, and Kalodimos study provides several useful
insights, but like many observational empirical studies of corporate
governance, it is also subject to endogeneity problems.102 To begin, one
might question whether the BAP-announcement finding would generalize
to a broader population of firms. Public statements by the Comptroller
indicate that he selected the BAP target firms based on specific criteria,
including a “fail[ure] to align executive compensation with business
performance.”103 It is thus plausible that BAP-targeted firms, relative to
those that the BAP did not target, were particularly likely to benefit from
proxy access. Bhandari and her coauthors attempt to assuage this concern
by presenting evidence that firms’ abnormal returns surrounding the
Business Roundtable stay and another announcement—their proxy for
expected benefits from proxy access—do not predict whether the firms
were targeted.104 However, the Comptroller may have targeted firms for
good reasons that their expected-benefit measure does not capture—for
example, because the benefits became apparent only after these events,
which occurred approximately four years before the BAP
announcement.105
Additionally, the authors’ brief discussion of the popularity of 3/3
proposals raises intriguing questions that merit further study. What role,
if any, have proxy access terms other than ownership thresholds and
holding periods played in driving vote outcomes? Bhandari and her
100.
101.

Id.
Indeed, Bhandari and her coauthors explicitly reject the possibility that the
observed “convergence may be explained if the optimal terms for proxy access do not
differ across firms,” which they find “implausible given the initial variation in proposed
terms and the variation across targets in their size and ownership structures.” Id. at 19.
102. See generally Yair Listokin, Interpreting Empirical Estimates of the Effect of
Corporate Governance, 10 AM. L. & ECON. REV. 90 (2008) (describing and modeling the
endogeneity difficulties faced by empirical studies of corporate governance).
103. Boardroom Accountability Project, OFFICE OF THE N.Y.C. COMPTROLLER,
https://comptroller.nyc.gov/services/financial-matters/boardroom-accountabilityproject/overview [https://perma.cc/JDW9-KLZF] (last visited Sept. 25, 2017).
104. See Bhandari et al., supra note 95, at 14–17.
105. See id. at 10–11 (noting the stay and Dodd announcements occurred in 2010,
while the BAP announcement occurred in 2014).
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coauthors apparently code only whether a proposal fits the 3/3 template,
even though the proposals may have other substantive features, such as
aggregation limits. And what role have preexisting and competing
management provisions played? The Bhandari study does not track the
presence of management-sponsored proxy access, which is important
both as a descriptive matter and for assessing shareholders’ preferences
regarding terms. Finally, is there reason to suspect that coordination and
collective-action problems do not account for the observed convergence
toward standardized terms? The authors’ regression analysis of vote
outcomes indicates that 3/3 proposals are associated with greater
shareholder support—which suggests that shareholders may prefer
standardized terms—but there are numerous omitted variables that may
account for this result.106 Additional research is necessary to answer these
questions.
II. A THEORY OF THE ROLE OF STANDARDIZATION IN CORPORATE
GOVERNANCE
As previously discussed, scholars and other commentators
frequently criticize both regulators’ and private parties’ attempts to
standardize corporate law and governance. 107 According to this view,
standardized corporate governance is inefficient because it fails to
recognize firms’ heterogeneity. But on reflection, there is no a priori
reason this must be so, and as prior empirical research shows, there is
frequently standardization in corporate contracting. 108 This Part thus
offers an alternative theory, styled as an informal principal–agent model,
in which standardization plays a positive role in corporate governance.
Under this theory, principals prefer standardization because there are
transaction costs associated with using the control rights they possess.
Standardization reduces these transaction costs, thereby increasing
principals’ ability to hold their agents accountable. Section II.A describes
the foundations of this informal model, while section II.B ties the theory
to proxy access. Section II.C relates the theory to other explanations for

106. For example, it is possible that certain types of proponents, such as public
pension funds, tend to both submit 3/3 proposals and target firms at which a proposal
would enjoy success.
107. See supra notes 1–8, 63–69 and accompanying text.
108. See Kahan & Klausner, supra note 18, at 740–59.
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the role of standardization, in both the property literature and the
corporate law literature.
A. DIVERSIFICATION AND TRANSACTION COSTS AS DRIVERS OF
STANDARDIZATION
To develop this theory, I begin with an informal principal–agent
model based on the “principal costs” framework developed by Goshen
and Squire.109 In the first instance, I assume the principal is undiversified.
As we shall see, this analysis suggests that the optimal corporate
governance structure will vary from firm to firm. However, when the
assumption that the principal is not diversified is relaxed, the recurring
transaction costs that the principal must incur to exercise her control
rights—costs that arise anew for each firm whose terms differ from those
of other firms—increase the attractiveness of a standardized corporate
governance structure.
1. Undiversified Ownership and Optimal Heterogeneity
Consider a principal (P) who hires an agent (A) to manage a widgetmanufacturing firm (F). Assume P invests her entire savings in F, so she
is undiversified. Since the future is uncertain, the parties’ contract is
necessarily “incomplete.” 110 For example, technological change could
render widgets obsolete, requiring a change in business strategy. The
parties could attempt to specify in their initial contract how to handle such
109.
110.

See generally Goshen & Squire, supra note 1.
There is a substantial interdisciplinary body of literature in law and economics
on “incomplete contracts.” See, e.g., Philippe Aghion & Patrick Bolton, An Incomplete
Contracts Approach to Financial Contracting, 59 REV. ECON. STUD. 473 (1992); Ian
Ayres & Robert Gertner, Filling Gaps in Incomplete Contracts: An Economic Theory of
Default Rules, 99 YALE L.J. 87 (1989); Stephen M. Bainbridge, Director Primacy: The
Means and Ends of Corporate Governance, 97 NW. U. L. REV. 547 (2003); Arnoud W.A.
Boot & Jonathan R. Macey, Monitoring Corporate Performance: The Role of Objectivity,
Proximity, and Adaptability in Corporate Governance, 89 CORNELL L. REV. 356, 361
(2004); Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, Contract and Fiduciary Duty, 36 J.L.
& ECON. 425, 426 (1993); Sanford J. Grossman & Oliver D. Hart, The Costs and Benefits
of Ownership: A Theory of Vertical and Lateral Integration, 94 J. POL. ECON. 691 (1986);
Oliver Hart & John Moore, Property Rights and the Nature of the Firm, 98 J. POL. ECON.
1119 (1990); Robert E. Scott, A Theory of Self-Enforcing Indefinite Agreements, 103
COLUM. L. REV. 1641 (2003).
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contingencies, but in many cases, it would be prohibitively costly (if not
impossible) to do so. Instead, the contract assigns “control rights” (R) to
one party or the other (or both). For instance, the contract might allocate
day-to-day decisionmaking authority to A and give P the right to fire A
for “good cause.”
Assuming the parties wish to maximize the value of the enterprise,
one can expect the parties to divide R between them with a view to
minimizing the costs produced by each party’s exercise of control.
Goshen and Squire call these costs “principal costs” and “agent costs”:
principal costs are the costs that arise when P exercises control, and agent
costs are the costs that arise when A exercises control.111 By minimizing
these costs, the parties maximize the cash flows available to them jointly
and can then allocate these cash flows between them as they see fit. As
Goshen and Squire explain, the relative efficiency of allocating R to one
party or the other depends on firm-specific characteristics such as F’s
industry, P’s expertise, and A’s honesty. 112 Accordingly, if these
characteristics do in fact vary in relevant ways from firm to firm, the
optimal allocation of R will also vary from firm to firm.113 This conclusion
is essentially a version of the optimal-heterogeneity claim.
As an illustration, consider the previously mentioned right to fire for
“good cause.” Suppose that P is competent and can easily understand F’s
business. Here, the parties might efficiently define “good cause”
expansively, allowing P to fire A for any reason (save perhaps racial or
other discrimination)—in other words, at-will employment.
Alternatively, suppose that P has limited competence, F has a complex
business structure, and A is a genius with an “idiosyncratic vision” for the
company.114 The parties expect that A’s idiosyncratic vision will lead to
long-term profitability, but they also realize that P may be tempted to
inefficiently interfere in the short term if she lacks the information
111. See Goshen & Squire, supra note 1, at 784. Though related, Goshen and Squire’s
definition of “agent costs” differs somewhat from Jensen and Meckling’s definition of
“agency costs.” While Goshen and Squire’s definition is limited to costs that agents
produce when they exercise control, the Jensen and Meckling definition also includes
“monitoring costs” that Goshen and Squire would include within their definition of
principal costs. See id. at 776–77, 784–85.
112. Id. at 796–805.
113. See id.
114. Cf. Zohar Goshen & Assaf Hamdani, Corporate Control and Idiosyncratic
Vision, 125 YALE L.J. 560 (2016).
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necessary to accurately evaluate A’s performance. In this case, the parties
might efficiently define “good cause” such that a finding of fraud or selfdealing is necessary before P can fire A.
2. Diversification, Transaction Costs, and Optimal Standardization
So far, this analysis has assumed that P holds an undiversified
investment portfolio consisting solely of equity in F. Let us now relax this
assumption and consider another possibility: P holds a diversified
portfolio consisting of 500 firms. 115 Assume further that there are two
types of transaction costs associated with the exercise of any given R.
First, P must incur costs to determine the scope of R. P bears this cost
once per each unique R. Second, P must incur a cost to determine whether
she can use R at a firm. This is a recurring cost: P must bear it again for
each firm at which she wishes to use R. For example, to fire A under a
“good cause” standard, P must first determine (1) the scope of the good
cause standard and (2) whether A’s conduct meets that standard. To the
extent that the standard’s content varies from firm to firm, P must incur
the costs of determining this content again for each different firm (in
addition to the costs of determining whether the standard applies to A’s
conduct).
These transaction costs can make standardization in R more efficient
than heterogeneity. Consider again the good cause standard for firing A.
If each firm in her portfolio has a different good cause standard, P must
repeatedly incur the cost of determining the standard’s scope for each
individual firm in the portfolio. 8: might define “good cause” to mean
fraud or self-dealing; 8# might define it to mean fraud, self-dealing, or
115. This condition is likely to be satisfied in the real word. Many investors, including
those most likely to make use of proxy access, are diversified. See, e.g., Pension /
Investment Management: Asset Allocation, OFFICE OF THE N.Y.C. COMPTROLLER,
http://comptroller.nyc.gov/services/financial-matters/pension/asset-allocation [https://pe
rma.cc/L39R-BL3T] (last visited Sept. 25, 2017); 2009 CII Letter, supra note 16 (noting
CII members’ diversification). Indeed, a longstanding theoretical literature in finance has
predicted that the average investor will own something resembling the “market.” See,
e.g., William F. Sharpe, Capital Asset Prices: A Theory of Market Equilibrium Under
Conditions of Risk, 19 J. FIN. 425 (1964). The capital asset pricing model (CAPM)
implies that the mean-variance efficient portfolio consists of value-weighted interests in
all capital assets. See id. The investor may then lever this portfolio up or down according
to her risk aversion.
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gross negligence; 8" might define it to mean fraud, self-dealing, or simple
negligence; and so on. If each firm has the same good cause standard, by
contrast, P must incur this cost only once, and the only cost that remains
is the cost of determining whether A’s conduct meets the standard. The
reduced transaction costs make it more likely that P will exercise the right
when it is efficient to do so. In other words, the reduction of transaction
costs improves allocative efficiency.116
As the preceding analysis shows, in the presence of diversification,
standardization can be more efficient than heterogeneity. Without
diversification, one might expect the parties to seek heterogeneity in
governance to suit each firm’s unique circumstances. But once P is
diversified, the calculus changes. Diversification transforms suboptimal
standardization into optimal standardization. Of course, this does not
necessarily imply that complete standardization (i.e., wholesale
uniformity) is optimal. Rather, one might characterize the resulting
equilibrium as either “limited standardization” or “limited heterogeneity.”
Two caveats are in order. My theory explains only a plausible basis
for how standardization could be more efficient than heterogeneity. In the
real world, things may be different. Transaction costs might be quite
small. Investors might not be diversified. It is therefore necessary to turn
to the empirical evidence to assess whether this theory holds outside of
the ivory tower.
B. OPTIMAL STANDARDIZATION IN PROXY ACCESS
With this theory in mind, I now turn to proxy access. Could
diversification and transaction costs explain a preference for standardized
proxy access terms? To explore the plausibility of my theory and generate
empirical predictions that can be tested, it is useful to think of the private
ordering of proxy access in three stages: the proposal stage, the voting
stage, and the use stage. Each stage involves transaction costs, and in
theory, any of these transaction costs could lead to standardization. As
shall become clear, however, the first two types of transaction costs
essentially represent defects in the voting process, while only use-stage
transaction costs—which are essentially the transaction costs discussed in
the previous section—render standardized proxy access efficient.

116. Economists have long recognized that transaction costs impede allocative
efficiency. See, e.g., R. H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. & ECON. 1 (1960).
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1. Proposal-Stage and Voting-Stage Transaction Costs
In the “proposal stage” of the private ordering of proxy access, a
shareholder proposes a proxy access bylaw through Rule 14a-8. To make
a proposal, the proponent must both decide on a company to target and
determine the terms of her proposal. These activities, however, require
the proponent to spend time and money gathering information about the
firm, such as the firm’s business activities, ownership structure, and
governance characteristics. These information-gathering expenses are
transaction costs. Conceivably, these proposal-stage transaction costs
could lead shareholders to propose a uniform set of terms based on what
they believe to be the best set of terms “on average.” Ultimately, these
costs could lead firms to suboptimally adopt standardized terms,
particularly if investors are not presented with alternatives. An empirical
test might therefore look to whether investors were able to express a
preference for alternative terms, whether presented by management or
other shareholders.
In the “voting stage,” shareholders vote on the proxy access proposal
that appears on the corporate ballot. To determine how to vote,
shareholders must assess whether the terms of the proposal are superior
to (1) no proxy access (the “no-access default”) and (2) management’s
proposed or preexisting alternative (if one exists). Again, however, these
activities require the shareholders to spend time and money gathering
information about the firm. Like in the proposal stage, these informationgathering expenses are transaction costs. Conceivably, these voting-stage
transaction costs could lead investors to vote for standardized terms over
alternative heterogeneous terms—even though alternative terms would be
a better fit—if shareholders believe the voting-stage informationgathering costs will likely exceed the benefit, if any, that heterogeneous
terms produce for them individually—particularly to the extent that each
shareholder believes that her vote will not be dispositive. This could lead
firms to adopt standardized terms if shareholders are not presented with
credible information about the benefits of the alternative terms. An
empirical test might therefore search for evidence of shareholders being
unable to distinguish between the benefits of alternative terms.
2. Use-Stage Transaction Costs
In the “use stage,” shareholders use a firm’s proxy access bylaw to
nominate a director candidate. Here, shareholders incur transaction costs
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determining (1) the scope of the firm’s proxy access provision and (2)
how it will apply to their ability to nominate a candidate. These are
essentially the same types of transaction costs that the theoretical
discussion in Section II.A contemplates. Assuming the ECMH, one would
expect shareholders to predict and discount to present value any such
transaction costs that might arise when evaluating the relative efficiency
of different proxy access terms at the voting stage. Accordingly, if usestage transaction costs exceed the benefits produced by heterogeneity,
these costs could explain shareholders’ voting patterns and the trend
toward standardization.
Some rudimentary formal analysis should clarify the potential effect
of these use-stage transaction costs. For firm -, the firm’s proxy access
provision can be defined as the set of attributes QF O
1QF: , QF# , QF" , . . . , QF6 0 , where QFG is a term in the provision (e.g.,
ownership threshold, holding period, maximum slate, aggregation limit,
etc.). The optimal-heterogeneity claim implies that the optimal QF varies
significantly from firm to firm, while the optimal-standardization theory
implies that the optimal QF will be standardized (at least relative to that
predicted by the optimal-heterogeneity theory). For simplicity, suppose
that QF is univariate: the percentage of shares a shareholder must own to
force the board to include the shareholder’s nominees in the company
proxy statement (the “ownership threshold”). One might understand the
default rule (no proxy access) as QF O 50%. Each percentage value of QF
also has an economic value YZ5 . For example, suppose Y!<% O $85 ,
Y!% O $95, and Y"% O $90. In the absence of transaction costs, QF O 5%
is optimal.
Now, assume there are transaction costs associated with using QF that
reduce YZ5 by N to YZ5 ∗ . The variable N includes both the transaction costs
themselves—which are a function of interpreting the scope and
applicability of QF —and, more importantly, the reduction in use of QF
below the optimal level. Partially because unfamiliar percentage values
of QF impose greater use-stage transaction costs—which in turn cause
shareholders to use QF less frequently than is optimal—the value of N
differs according to the percentage value of QF . Suppose, for example, that
for QF O 50%, N O $1; for QF O 5%, N O $20; and for QF O 3%, N O $5.
Using the same base economic values as before, this implies that Y!<% ∗ O
$85 K $1 O $84 , Y!% ∗ O $95 K $20 O $75 , and Y"% ∗ O $90 K $5 O
$85. Once transaction costs enter the picture, QF O 3% is optimal.
Use-stage transaction costs are likely real and substantial. To be sure,
it would probably cost an investor little to determine the difference
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between a 5% ownership threshold and a 3% ownership threshold. But in
the real world, QF is not univariate. Real proxy access bylaws are much
more complicated than a simple ownership threshold, and a bylaw’s
terms—particularly the ownership threshold, holding period, aggregation
limits, and procedural requirements—can interact in complex ways. 117
Nevertheless, the magnitude of these transaction costs and the extent to
which they outweigh the benefits of heterogeneity are ultimately
empirical questions. An empirical test might search for evidence that
investors express a preference for standardized terms—an issue that Part
III addresses.
C. RELATION TO OTHER LITERATURE
My theory, whereby standardization in corporate governance is
optimal because of diversification and use-stage transaction costs, is

117. Consider, for example, the proxy access bylaw of McDonald’s Corporation. At
3846 words, the McDonald’s proxy access bylaw is written in the sort of dense legal
jargon that only a high-priced attorney can decipher. See McDonald’s Corp., Bylaws of
McDonald’s Corporation as Amended and Restated with Effect as of October 26, 2015
(Form 8-K) (Oct. 28, 2015). Even with a standardized form, shareholders may find it
difficult to understand and ensure compliance with the bylaw. First, there are the
eligibility requirements. Although the ownership threshold, holding period, and
aggregation limits are relatively easy to find, see id. § 12(E), the definition of
“ownership” itself is considerably more complex. To determine whether their shares
“count” for the bylaw, shareholders would need to ensure that they hold both (1) “the full
voting and investment rights pertaining to the shares” and (2) “the full economic interest
in (including the opportunity for profit and risk of loss on)” the shares, subject to three
relatively complicated exclusions. Id. § 12(A)(4). Particularly for groups of shareholders,
ensuring compliance with these eligibility and ownership requirements could be quite
onerous. Second, there is procedure. Not only does the proxy access provision itself
impose various procedural requirements, but it also interacts with other terms in the
McDonald’s bylaws, including the advance-notice nomination requirements. See id. §
12(C). Ensuring compliance with these procedural requirements would require our
would-be nominators to incur additional costs once they determine they are eligible.
Particularly given that a shareholder considering using a firm’s proxy access bylaw could
incur all the aforementioned expenses only to discover they cannot use the bylaw, these
costs could exert a strong deterrent effect on shareholders from ever using proxy access
in the first place. With standardized bylaws, on the other hand, would-be nominators can
realize economies of scope when determining their eligibility for proxy access at different
firms.
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related to—but distinct from—two other well-known theories in the
literature. This section discusses and distinguishes these theories.
First, Professors Thomas Merrill and Henry Smith argue that the
“numerus clausus,” defined as “the principle that property rights must
conform to certain standardized forms,” underlies numerous different
doctrinal areas in the law of property, from estates in land to intellectual
property.118 Merrill and Smith ultimately trace this standardization to the
“in rem nature of property rights,” namely the third-party information
costs associated with acquiring and avoiding violating these rights.119
My theory, like Merrill and Smith’s, links standardization with
information costs, but it also departs in significant ways. While Merrill
and Smith focus on how third parties must measure property rights to
acquire and avoid violating these rights, my theory approaches the
problem from a different angle: that of the rights holder. In my theory, the
person incurring the measurement cost is an “owner” (or, if one prefers
the contractarian metaphor,120 a “party to the contract”), not an outsider
118. Thomas W. Merrill & Henry E. Smith, Optimal Standardization in the Law of
Property: The Numerus Clausus Principle, 110 YALE L.J. 1, 3–4, 9–24 (2000).
119. Id. at 8, 24–42. Smith extends this analysis to contract boilerplate, focusing on
the information externalities that deviation from boilerplate can produce. Henry E. Smith,
Modularity in Contracts: Boilerplate and Information Flow, 104 MICH. L. REV. 1175,
1210–14 (2006). Professor Joshua Fairfield, also focusing on contracts, argues that
standardization can reduce the information externalities associated with obtaining
“informed consent.” See Joshua Fairfield, The Cost of Consent: Optimal Standardization
in the Law of Contract, 58 EMORY L.J. 1401, 1431–51 (2009). Smith’s and Fairfield’s
theories are like my own in that we each focus on transaction costs, but in my theory, the
transaction costs arise when parties to the contract attempt to use contractual rights they
have already acquired, not when parties attempt to enter the contract in the first place.
Additionally, Fairfield and Smith focus on externalities, whereas I focus on costs that the
parties internalize. Finally, Professors Charles Goetz and Robert Scott frame the benefits
of contractual standardization in terms of error reduction. See Charles J. Goetz & Robert
E. Scott, The Limits of Expanded Choice: An Analysis of the Interaction Between Express
and Implied Contract Terms, 73 CAL. L. REV. 261, 264–89 (1985). To the extent that
“error” reduction plays a role in my theory, the error reduction consists of less costly use
of corporate governance rights rather than merely a reduced incidence of interpretive
errors.
120. The contractarian paradigm has been dominant in corporate law for decades. See
Michael Klausner, The Contractarian Theory of Corporate Law: A Generation Later, 31
J. CORP. L. 779 (2006). Some scholars have offered alternative accounts. See, e.g., Victor
Brudney, Corporate Governance, Agency Costs, and the Rhetoric of Contract, 85
COLUM. L. REV. 1403 (1985); Melvin A. Eisenberg, The Conception that the Corporation
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who wishes to acquire the right or avoid violating it. An important
consequence of this distinction is that the creators of the costs produced
by heterogeneous corporate governance terms must internalize these
costs,121 while the information costs that Merrill and Smith discuss are
externalities. This distinction is crucial given the common understanding
that the law should regulate conduct that generates externalities
differently from conduct that does not.122
Second, Professors Marcel Kahan and Michael Klausner identify
“learning” and “network” benefits as drivers of standardization in
corporate contracting. 123 As Kahan and Klausner explain, the former
“arise[] when a firm adopts a contract term that has been commonly used
in the past,” while the latter “arise[] when a firm adopts a term that will
be part of the firm’s contract at the same time that it is part of many other
firms’ contracts.” 124 Examples of learning benefits include “drafting
efficiency,” “reduced uncertainty over the meaning and validity of a term
due to prior judicial rulings,” and “familiarity with a term among lawyers,
other professionals, and the investment community.” 125 Examples of
network benefits include “higher quality and lower cost legal and
professional services” as a result of professionals’ familiarity with the
term, more accurate pricing of the term as a result of investors’ and
analysts’ pricing of the term, and the clarity afforded by “judicial
interpretations” of the term.126
My theory, like Kahan and Klausner’s, focuses on market actors’
familiarity with the terms. If one understands learning and network
benefits as cost savings, then these benefits are equivalent to the reduction

Is a Nexus of Contracts, and the Dual Nature of the Firm, 24 J. CORP. L. 819 (1999);
Henry Hansmann & Reinier Kraakman, Property, Contract, and Verification: The
Numerus Clausus Problem and the Divisibility of Rights, 31 J. LEGAL STUD. 373 (2002).
121. To the extent that standardized terms create network benefits, this internalization
need not necessarily be complete.
122. See, e.g., Roberta Romano, Answering the Wrong Question: The Tenuous Case
for Mandatory Corporate Laws, 89 COLUM. L. REV. 1599, 1616–17 (1989) (favoring
mandatory rules if and only if externalities exist).
123. Kahan & Klausner, supra note 18. Klausner analyzes network effects in
additional detail in Michael Klausner, Corporations, Corporate Law, and Networks of
Contracts, 81 VA. L. REV. 757 (1995).
124. Kahan & Klausner, supra note 18, at 718.
125. Id. at 719–20.
126. Id. at 726.
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of transaction costs.127 However, the transaction cost framework yields
additional useful insights. First, while Kahan and Klausner focus on
learning and network externalities, 128 my theory approaches the issue
from the vantage point of a diversified principal who internalizes these
costs. My theory can thus explain the presence of standardization even in
the absence of externalities, which again is relevant for law and policy
given the common understanding that the law ought to treat conduct that
produces externalities differently from conduct that does not. Second, my
framework builds on a school of thought with a rich, longstanding history
in law and economics: the transaction costs approach. Transaction costs
have featured prominently in law and economics scholarship ever since
Coase popularized the concept in the early-to-mid-twentieth century.129
III. EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE ON THE PRIVATE ORDERING OF PROXY
ACCESS
As Part I explained, there has been vociferous debate about the place
of proxy access in corporate law and governance, with empirical research
yielding mixed results. The “one-size-does-not-fit-all” critique—a
127. It is important to note that Kahan’s and Klausner’s discussion of network
externalities focuses on positive externalities—that is, externalities that benefit third
parties. If one understands “out-of-network” contractual provisions as imposing negative
externalities in the form of transaction costs, then these negative externalities would be
akin to the transaction costs that I have identified. As discussed below, however, my
theory does not depend on externalities at all; it can exist in a universe in which there is
only one principal.
128. Kahan & Klausner, supra note 18, at 715–17.
129. See generally R. H. Coase, The Nature of the Firm, 4 ECONOMICA 386 (1937);
Coase, supra note 116. Other important works include Oliver E. Williamson, The
Economics of Organization: The Transaction Cost Approach, 87 AM. J. SOC. 548 (1981);
Oliver E. Williamson, Transaction-Cost Economics: The Governance of Contractual
Relations, 22 J.L. & ECON. 233 (1979). Prominent Delaware jurists have also recognized
the importance of transaction costs. Drawing on their experience resolving alternativeentity disputes, Chief Justice Leo Strine and Vice Chancellor Travis Laster observe that
unlimited contractual freedom can impose transaction costs to the extent that investors
must evaluate unfamiliar terms in LLC and other alternative-entity governing documents.
See Leo E. Strine, Jr. & J. Travis Laster, The Siren Song of Unlimited Contractual
Freedom, in RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON PARTNERSHIPS, LLCS AND ALTERNATIVE FORMS
OF BUSINESS ORGANIZATIONS 11, 18 (Robert W. Hillman & Mark J. Loewenstein eds.,
2015). Chief Justice Strine and Vice Chancellor Laster note that standardization can
reduce these transaction costs. Id.
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familiar criticism in corporate law scholarship and commentary—has
been perhaps the most common argument leveled against proxy access.130
These critics, believing that heterogeneity in terms is optimal,
championed private ordering as allowing firms to tailor their provision of
proxy access to their diverse circumstances. But as Part II demonstrates,
there are sound theoretical reasons to doubt the underlying premise that
heterogeneity in terms is necessarily optimal.
Ultimately, however, these issues cannot be resolved based on theory
alone. This Part therefore takes an empirical turn, analyzing the drivers
and effects of vote outcomes for over 200 proxy access shareholder
proposals from the 2012 through 2016 proxy seasons and presenting
evidence on the proxy access regimes that firms adopted in response.
Section III.A describes the data. Section III.B presents descriptive
statistics, which show a convergence over time toward standardized
terms, greater shareholder support for proposals that feature standardized
terms, and a convergence toward standardized terms even in firms’
adopted proxy access regimes. Section III.C reports the results of a
regression analysis of shareholder proposal vote outcomes, showing that
the presence of standardized terms is associated with significantly higher
shareholder support. Finally, Section III.D employs a regressiondiscontinuity design to assess the market reaction to “close call” votes,
providing evidence that the market has generally attached a positive value
to those proposals. Overall, these findings support the optimalstandardization theory developed in Part II.
A. DATA
To evaluate the past several years’ private ordering of proxy access,
I collected data from several sources. First, I gathered data on shareholder
proposals and vote outcomes for all publicly traded companies in
FactSet’s Shark Repellent database 131 from 2012 through 2016 and
extracted the proxy statements of these proposals from EDGAR.132 I then
read these proxy statements, hand coded the proposals’ substantive terms
130.
131.

See supra notes 1–8, 63–69 and accompanying text.
SHARKREPELLENT.NET, https://sharkrepellent.net [https://perma.cc/RWJ9-AH
BE] (last visited Apr. 23, 2017).
132. EDGAR: Company Filings, U.S. SEC. & EXCHANGE COMMISSION, https://www.s
ec.gov/edgar/searchedgar/companysearch.html [https://perma.cc/AL4E-S
577] (last visited Sept. 26, 2017).
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along eleven dimensions, and hand coded the major substantive terms of
any dueling management proposal or preexisting proxy access bylaw that
the firm had already adopted. For ease of analysis, I created four dummy
variables133 from these hand-coded data: the first equal to 1 if the proposal
was a standard “3/3” proposal, the second equal to 1 if the proposal
contained all the other details from the BAP proposal template,134 the third
equal to 1 if there was either a dueling or preexisting 3/3 provision, and
the fourth equal to 1 if there was either a dueling or preexisting 5/3
provision. All dueling and preexisting provisions fit either the 3/3 or 5/3
mold. Next, I gathered data on firms’ adopted proxy access regimes as of
January 31, 2017 from a dataset produced by Covington & Burling
attorneys and published by the Council of Institutional Investors (CII).135
I then linked the proposal and vote-outcome data with various other
commonly used databases, including financial statement data from
FactSet Fundamentals, 136 ownership data from FactSet Ownership, 137
governance and board data from Institutional Shareholder Services
(ISS),138 and stock-return data from the Center for Research on Security
Prices (CRSP).139 For all analyses, I exclude firms with more than one
class of common stock. This process yielded 213 total firm-year
observations for the shareholder proposals. The Appendix includes my
coding rubric, variable definitions, summary statistics, and an example of
a BAP-style proposal.

133.

0.

134.
135.

A dummy variable is a binary variable that can take only one of two values: 1 or

For additional explanation, see infra Appendix at Table A.1.
Updates are available at Proxy Access, COUNCIL OF INSTITUTIONAL INV.,
http://www.cii.org/proxy_access [https://perma.cc/K465-MNXA] (last visited Sept. 26,
2017). I will provide the January 2017 version upon request.
136. Data: Fundamentals, FACTSET, https://www.factset.com/data/company_data/
fundamentals [https://perma.cc/UMB8-NVLX] (last visited Sept. 26, 2017).
137. Data: Ownership, FACTSET, https://www.factset.com/data/company_data/own
ership [https://perma.cc/7LLY-2R52] (last visited Sept. 26, 2017).
138. ISS Analytics, INSTITUTIONAL SHAREHOLDER SERVS., https://www.issgovern
ance.com/solutions/iss-analytics [https://perma.cc/USY7-ZYFK] (last visited Oct. 21,
2017).
139. CRSP US Stock Databases, U. CHI. BOOTH SCH. BUS. CTR. FOR RES. SEC. PRICES,
http://www.crsp.com/products/research-products/crsp-us-stock-databases [https://perma
.cc/RD7E-N7EE] (last visited Sept. 26, 2017).
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B. DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS: PROPOSAL TERMS, VOTE OUTCOMES, AND
PROVISIONS IN EFFECT
The descriptive statistics reveal several interesting trends. First, the
shareholder proposals in my sample are remarkably standardized, with a
clear majority (80%) fitting the BAP template—3% ownership
requirement, three-year holding period, 25% maximum slate, and no
aggregation limit (among other details). As Figure 1 shows, this
standardization began slowly, with most proposals during the first two
years not even fitting the 3/3 form. In 2015, however, the standardization
reached a tipping point, and by 2016, nearly all proposals fit the standard
BAP template.
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Figure 1: Vote Outcomes by Proposed Terms over Time140

The second noteworthy trend, apparent from a casual visual
inspection of Figure 1, is that standardized proposals appear to have
garnered greater shareholder support, measured as the percentage votes
cast in favor, than nonstandard proposals. Indeed, Figure 2 confirms that
on average, BAP-style 3/3 proposals have earned the greatest amount of
support, followed by 3/3 proposals with nonstandard details, and finally
“oddball” proposals that do not follow the 3/3 template. These results
suggest that shareholders may in fact prefer standardized proposals,
although additional analysis will be necessary to confirm this.

140. “3/3, Standard Details” refers to proposals that follow all substantive terms of
the BAP template. “3/3, Nonstandard Details” refers to proposals that contain a 3%
ownership threshold and three-year holding period but fail to follow some or all of the
other BAP details. “Oddball” refers to proposals that do not follow the 3/3 standard.
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Figure 2: Mean Vote Outcomes by Proposed Terms141
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Another dimension on which to view the shareholder proposals is the
presence, if any, of a competing management proposal or preexisting
proxy access bylaw. Figure 3 restricts the sample to standardized BAPstyle proposals and shows vote outcomes over time by the terms of the
competing management proposal or preexisting bylaw, if any (collapsing
these two categories into one). As Figure 3 shows, no competing
provision existed opposite a BAP-style shareholder proposal until 2015,
when thirteen 5/3 proposals and two 3/3 proposals appeared. In 2016, as
firms adopted proxy access in greater numbers,142 numerous competing
provisions appeared, mostly fitting the 3/3 mold.
141. “3/3, Standard Details” refers to proposals that follow all substantive terms of
the BAP template. “3/3, Nonstandard Details” refers to proposals that contain a 3%
ownership threshold and three-year holding period but fail to follow some or all of the
other BAP details. “Oddball” refers to proposals that do not follow the 3/3 standard. Error
bars represent 95% confidence intervals.
142. See GIBSON DUNN & CRUTCHER LLP, SHAREHOLDER PROPOSAL DEVELOPMENTS
DURING THE 2016 PROXY SEASON 19 (2016), http://www.gibsondunn.com/publications/
Documents/Shareholder-Proposal-Developments-2016-Proxy-Season.pdf [https://perma
.cc/ZA29-NBW2].
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Figure 3: BAP-Style Proposal Vote Outcomes by Management Terms
over Time143

Casual visual inspection of Figure 3 suggests that shareholder
support for proposals facing competing 5/3 provisions was relatively
indistinguishable from shareholder support for proposals that faced no
competing provision at all, while shareholder support for proposals facing
competing 3/3 provisions tended to be significantly lower than support
for other proposals. Again, Figure 4 confirms this: on average,
shareholder proposals facing competing 3/3 provisions received
significantly lower support, but there is little difference between the other
two categories. One plausible explanation for these results is that while
shareholders prefer the BAP template compared to other shareholder
proposals, they have also preferred boards’ “improvements” over
shareholder-proponents’ templates.

143. “3/3, Standard Details” refers to proposals that follow all substantive terms of
the BAP template. “3/3, Nonstandard Details” refers to proposals that contain a 3%
ownership threshold and three-year holding period but fail to follow some or all of the
other BAP details. “Oddball” refers to proposals that do not follow the 3/3 standard.
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Figure 4: Mean BAP-Style Proposal Vote Outcomes by Management
Terms144
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Finally, one might wonder how the terms of the proxy access
provisions that firms have adopted compare to those proposed. Focusing
on four major terms (ownership threshold, holding period, maximum
slate, and aggregation limits),145 Table 1 tracks these terms’ distribution
along three different categories: all shareholder proposals that made it to
a vote, majority-supported shareholder proposals, and provisions in
144. “3/3, Standard Details” refers to proposals that follow all substantive terms of
the BAP template. “3/3, Nonstandard Details” refers to proposals that contain a 3%
ownership threshold and three-year holding period but fail to follow some or all of the
other BAP details. “Oddball” refers to proposals that do not follow the 3/3 standard. Error
bars represent 95% confidence intervals.
145. For an explanation of how I coded these terms, see infra Appendix at Table A.1.
I view these as the most “major” terms in part because practitioner-authored reports focus
principally on these four terms. See, e.g., Yafit Cohn, The 2016 Proxy Season: Proxy
Access Proposals, HARV. L. SCH. F. ON CORP. GOVERNANCE & FIN. REG. (Aug. 26, 2016),
https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2016/08/26/the-2016-proxy-season-proxy-accessproposals [https://perma.cc/8224-M8UJ], and in part because these are the terms about
which I observed the most disagreement between boards and shareholder-proponents in
the proxy statements that I coded.
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effect. Each cell in the left-hand column displays the value of the term,
and each cell in the three right-hand columns displays the percentage of
provisions that feature that value. For example, Table 1a indicates that out
of all shareholder proposals that went to a vote, 8.9% featured a 1%
ownership threshold.
Overall, Table 1 shows a remarkable standardization across all four
terms. The ownership requirement has converged around 3% across all
three categories, and the holding period has converged around three years.
Meanwhile, the maximum slate and aggregation limits have also
converged around standardized terms, but the provisions in effect are
slightly more restrictive than the proposed terms: the maximum slate has
dropped from 25% to 20%, and aggregation limits have gone from
nonexistent to up to twenty shareholders. These drops would be consistent
with either an agency-cost explanation or an efficiency-based
explanation—that is, the drops may be attributable to either managerial
opportunism (perhaps combined with asset-manager opportunism) or the
possibility that market participants correctly judged that the additional
shareholder power would increase principal costs more than it would
reduce agency costs.146

146.

See generally Goshen & Squire, supra note 1.
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Table 1: Major Terms of Proposals and Adopted Provisions
Value
1%
1.5%
2%
3%
5%
20%

Proposals (All)
8.9%
0.5%
1.4%
89.2%
0.0%
0.0%

Value
1
2
3
Unspecified

Proposals (All)
4.2%
7.0%
88.7%
0.0%

Value
20%
24%
25%
34%
40%
48%
Other
No Limit

Proposals (All)
3.8%
2.3%
85.9%
0.5%
1.4%
5.2%
0.0%
0.9%

Value
Up to 20
Up to 25
None
Other

Proposals (All)
0%
0%
100%
0%

Table 1a: Ownership Threshold
Proposals (Passed)
Provisions in Effect
0.9%
0.0%
0.0%
0.0%
0.0%
0.0%
99.1%
96.8%
0.0%
2.4%
0.0%
0.8%
Table 1b: Holding Period (Years)
Proposals (Passed)
Provisions in Effect
0.9%
1.6%
0.0%
0.4%
99.1%
97.2%
0.0%
0.8%
Table 1c: Maximum Slate
Proposals (Passed)
Provisions in Effect
4.7%
83.4%
0.0%
0.0%
94.3%
14.2%
0.0%
0.0%
0.0%
0.0%
0.0%
0.0%
0.0%
0.8%
0.9%
1.2%
Table 1d: Aggregation Limits
Proposals (Passed)
Provisions in Effect
0%
88.1%
0%
2.8%
100%
2.8%
0%
6.3%

***
In sum, the descriptive statistics presented in this section show that
the private ordering of proxy access has produced remarkable
standardization, both overall and over time. Among proposals that made
it to a vote, majority-supported proposals, and provisions in effect, the
major terms have been relatively uniform. Additionally, shareholders
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have tended to express greater support, measured by the percentage of
votes cast in favor, for standardized proposals. For those commentators
who expected the private ordering of proxy access to produce
heterogeneity in terms, these findings should be surprising. Not only have
shareholders tended to submit proposals containing standardized terms,
but the proposals they have approved have tended to be even more
standardized. And boards have not avoided the one-size-fits-all
phenomenon. Although two of the provisions in effect are more restrictive
than shareholders’ proposals, they have still converged around
standardized terms. In the end, the so-called “3/3/20/20” model has
become market standard.147
C. REGRESSION ANALYSIS: STANDARDIZATION AND VOTE OUTCOMES
As the previous section shows, the private ordering of proxy access
has converged toward standardized terms. Despite this convergence,
however, it is still unclear whether shareholders in fact prefer this
standardization. Ultimately, it is possible that shareholders’ collectiveaction problems have impeded them from obtaining the optimal
heterogeneity that they would like. 148 Although shareholders’ greater
support for proposals featuring standardized terms suggests they have
preferred these terms, it is unclear whether this greater support is
attributable to the terms themselves or to some omitted variable. For
example, it is possible that the shareholder-proponents who submit
standardized proposals are simply more effective at identifying the firms
that most need proxy access, and the greater support for standardized
proposals is a product of other shareholders’ recognition that the firms
would benefit more from proxy access. Indeed, given the NYC
Comptroller’s stated reasons for selecting the BAP’s target firms, this is
a plausible theory.149 It is therefore necessary to dive deeper into the data
to eliminate alternative explanations.
147. See Alexandra Higgins & Peter Kimball, The Finer Points of Proxy Access Come
Under the Microscope, INSTITUTIONAL SHAREHOLDER SERVS.: GOVERNANCE INSIGHTS,
https://www.issgovernance.com/finer-points-proxy-access-bylaws-come-microscope
[https://perma.cc/8FXJ-RQ6S] (last visited Sept. 26, 2017) (noting “[t]he basic features
of proxy access bylaws are largely consistent” and the 3/3/20/20 model “has taken hold
as the most widely adopted model”).
148. See Bhandari et al., supra note 95, at 4–5.
149. See Boardroom Accountability Project, supra note 103, and accompanying text.
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To shed additional light on shareholders’ apparent preferences, I run
several multivariate ordinary least squares (OLS) regressions with the
votes cast in favor of the proposal as the outcome variable. The main
explanatory variables of interest are dummy variables indicating whether
the proposal fit the “3/3” template, whether the proposal included the
additional BAP-template details, and whether there was a “competing”
(i.e., concurrently proposed or preexisting) management provision (which
I divide into two categories, according to whether the competing
provision fit the 3/3 template or the 5/3 template150). As controls, I include
covariates related to whether management recommended voting “for” the
proposal, the firms’ ownership, governance, board composition, financial
characteristics, and lagged risk-adjusted stock returns, shareholders’
views toward the firms’ executive compensation, and fixed effects for
proponent type, industry, and year. These controls, described further in
the Appendix, 151 help to eliminate alternative explanations for any
observed association between standardization and shareholder support.
Table 2 reports the results of these regressions, with most of the controls
omitted from the table for ease of exposition.

150. As previously explained, all competing provisions in the sample fit one of those
two templates.
151. See infra Appendix at Table A.2.
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Table 2: OLS Regression Analysis of Vote Outcomes152
Dependent Variable
Votes Cast in Favor of Proposal (%)
3/3
BAP

(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

(5)

20.231***

17.356***

26.995***

28.936***

29.878***

(6.315)

(5.688)

(6.515)

(7.284)

(6.328)

14.211***

20.449***

14.193**

14.975**

8.518*

(5.286)
Comp. (3/3)
Comp. (5/3)
Mgmt. Rec.
Constant
Firm
Controls
ProponentType F.E.
Industry
F.E.
Year F.E.
Obs.

(4.442)

(6.178)

(6.979)

(5.073)

(22.780***

(22.395***

(23.837***

(29.593***

(2.205)

(3.679)

(3.888)

(3.721)

(0.837

(5.060*

(5.977*

(11.083***

(2.539)

(2.853)

(3.255)

(3.058)

35.261***

37.697***

37.048***

34.923***

(6.452)

(6.544)

(7.697)

(7.609)

19.506***

19.281***

25.312

18.636

8.591

(3.886)

(3.974)

(15.888)

(20.665)

(23.087)

No

No

Yes

Yes

Yes

No

No

Yes

Yes

Yes

No

No

No

Yes

Yes

No

No

No

No

Yes

213

213

167

167

167

R2

0.283

0.507

0.731

0.769

0.822

Adjusted R2

0.276

0.495

0.665

0.666

0.734

34.969***

36.808***

21.094***

22.667***

30.567***

F Statistic
Note:

*p < 0.1; **p < 0.05; ***p < 0.01

This regression analysis supports the view that shareholders have
indeed preferred standardized terms. Across all specifications, including
those with controls, the coefficients for the standardized-term variables
are large and statistically significant. For example, the fifth model
indicates that the presence of a 3/3 proposal is associated with an
additional thirty percentage points of shareholder support for the proposal

152.

Figures in parentheses are robust standard errors clustered at the firm level.
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and the presence of all additional BAP details is associated with an
additional nine percentage points of shareholder support.
This analysis also yields useful insights regarding shareholders’
views toward competing management provisions. Consistent with the
previous section’s descriptive statistics, shareholders appear to have
preferred boards’ competing provisions—so long as they fit the 3/3 mold.
Across all specifications, the coefficients for the competing 3/3 dummy
are large and statistically significant. The fifth model, for example, shows
that the presence of a competing 3/3 provision is associated with thirty
fewer percentage points in support for the shareholder proposal. The
coefficients for the competing 5/3 variable, by contrast, are much lower,
and their statistical significance is sensitive to the specification. One
might reasonably interpret these results to suggest that shareholders have
generally preferred boards’ “improvements” to shareholders’ proposed
terms so long as the company provisions fit the 3/3 template. The presence
of a competing 5/3 provision, on the other hand, appears to have reduced
support for the shareholder proposal only slightly, if at all. In other words,
to the extent that shareholders have exhibited a preference for proxy
access, it appears to have been for standard 3/3 terms with the additional
BAP details and whatever innovations management has offered—a
standard model for proxy access.
Framed in terms of the theory developed in Part II, the evidence is
consistent with the possibility that use-stage transaction costs make
standardization optimal in some instances. First, proposal-stage
transaction costs cannot fully explain the prevalence of standardization in
proxy access. While proposal-stage transaction costs could conceivably
explain such phenomena as proponents’ use of the same proposal
template for different firms, these costs cannot adequately explain
shareholders’ rejection of alternative proposals presented by other
shareholders and management. 153 Despite the overall trend toward
convergence, shareholders did present alternative terms toward the
beginning of the private ordering of proxy access (including lower
ownership thresholds), and management did present shareholders with
their own alternative terms (including higher ownership thresholds).154
Second, nor can voting-stage transaction costs explain the convergence
toward standardized terms. When management presented shareholders
153.
154.

See supra Sections III.A.–B.
See supra Section III.A.
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with two types of more onerous terms—five-year ownership thresholds
and twenty-shareholder aggregation limits—and the potential benefits of
these provisions, shareholders appear to have rejected the former and
accepted the latter,155 suggesting that they have not been passive voters.156
And ultimately, firms adopted a standardized template.157 This leaves the
third type of transaction cost—use-stage transaction costs—as the most
likely culprit.
Two caveats are in order. First, as with all observational,
correlational studies, it is difficult to draw a causal inference. Although
reverse causality is not a concern, 158 there is always a possibility that
omitted variables are driving the observed relationship between
standardized terms and shareholder support. I include the more obvious
candidates as controls, though, so this possibility seems remote enough—
especially considering the size of the standardized-term variables’
coefficients. Second, and perhaps more significantly, the possibility of an
additional layer of agency costs limits one’s ability to infer shareholder
value from these vote outcomes. Even if the persons who vote
shareholders’ proxies appear to prefer standardized terms, many of those
making voting decisions are agents themselves, which creates the
possibility of what Professors Ronald Gilson and Jeffrey Gordon call the
“agency costs of agency capitalism”159 or what Chief Justice Strine calls
“the separation of ‘ownership from ownership.’” 160 For example, the

155.
156.

See supra Sections III.A.–B.
Nor does it seem that shareholders have simply voted on what they believed was
best for the “average” firm. Shareholders rejected proxy access altogether in many
instances, see supra Section III.A., which suggests that they sometimes judged that the
“no-access default” was superior.
157. See supra Section III.A.
158. Because the explanatory variables—including the proposal terms—are
temporally prior to the vote outcomes, the vote outcomes could not be exerting an effect
on the values of the explanatory variables.
159. See generally Ronald J. Gilson & Jeffrey N. Gordon, The Agency Costs of
Agency Capitalism: Activist Investors and the Revaluation of Governance Rights, 113
COLUM. L. REV. 863 (2013).
160. See generally Leo E. Strine, Jr., Toward a True Corporate Republic: A
Traditionalist Response to Bebchuk’s Solution for Improving Corporate America, 119
HARV. L. REV. 1759, 1764–66 (2006); Leo E. Strine, Jr., Can We Do Better by Ordinary
Investors? A Pragmatic Reaction to the Dueling Ideological Mythologists of Corporate
Law, 114 COLUM. L. REV. 449 (2014). Additionally, vote outcomes may diverge from
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employees of large institutional investors such as BlackRock who control
the firms’ proxy-voting policies might prefer standardization because the
burden of handling differing proxy access regimes would fall
disproportionately on them, without any of the commensurate benefit.
Indeed, prior literature has criticized the “corporate governance industry”
for supporting one-size-fits-all “best practices” that fail to recognize firm
heterogeneity.161
D. REGRESSION-DISCONTINUITY DESIGN: ASSESSING THE MARKET
REACTION TO “CLOSE CALLS”
Given the possibility of a divergence in interests between those
making voting decisions and the votes’ ultimate beneficiaries, it would be
appropriate to look to other sources to gain insight into the efficiency of
the standardized proxy access described in the preceding sections.
Assuming that share prices reflect all (or close to all) publicly available
information, market reactions may provide a better basis for assessing the
value of this standardized proxy access.162 Following recent research in
finance, 163 I therefore employ a regression-discontinuity (RD) design,
limiting the sample to BAP-style proposals only and excluding proposals
that face a competing management-sponsored 3/3 provision, 164 to
estimate the average value of these standardized provisions to
optimal outcomes even without these agency costs. See generally Yair Listokin,
Corporate Voting Versus Market Price Setting, 11 AM. L. & ECON. REV. 608 (2009).
161. Rose, supra note 7, at 916–19.
162. Cf. Rauterberg & Talley, supra note 74, at 1133 (assessing the value of
“corporate opportunity waivers” by reference to market reactions to their disclosure).
163. See Vicente Cuñat et al., The Vote Is Cast: The Effect of Corporate Governance
on Shareholder Value, 67 J. FIN. 1943 (2012) [hereinafter Cuñat et al., Vote Is Cast];
Vicente Cuñat et al., Say Pays! Shareholder Voice and Firm Performance, 20 REV. FIN.
1799 (2016); Caroline Flammer, Does Corporate Social Responsibility Lead to Superior
Financial Performance? A Regression Discontinuity Approach, 61 MGMT. SCI. 2549
(2015); Vicente Cuñat et al., Corporate Governance and Value: Evidence from “Close
Calls” on Shareholder Governance Proposals, 25 J. APPLIED CORP. FIN. 44 (2013)
[hereinafter Cuñat et al., Corporate Governance and Value].
164. I limit the sample to BAP-style proposals only and exclude proposals that face
management-sponsored 3/3 provisions to isolate the value of standardized proxy access.
Incidentally, this also helps to avoid endogeneity problems that could arise if proponents
tailored proposal terms to companies’ circumstances—because I consider only
standardized proposals, proponents cannot tailoring the terms to each company.
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shareholders. This section explains the research design in greater detail
and reports the results of this analysis.
1. Empirical Design and Caveats
RD is a research design that attempts to approximate a randomized
experiment using observational data. To begin, the researcher identifies a
“running variable” and assigns observations on one side of some
threshold (or “cutoff” point) to a treatment group and observations on the
other side of the threshold to a control group. 165 The researcher then
effectively limits the sample to observations that lie very close to the
threshold and calculates the difference in mean values of the outcome
variable of interest between the control and treatment groups. For
example, a researcher interested in the effect of a scholarship whose grant
is conditional on passing a bright-line threshold, such as eighty points on
a test, might compare the mean post-test income of students who earn
eighty points (the treatment group) with that of students who earn
seventy-nine points (the control group).166 By focusing on these “close
call” observations, the researcher can make a causal inference regarding
the effect of the scholarship on income. So long as the agent cannot
precisely control whether she ends up on one side of the threshold or the
other, assignment to the treatment or control group is “as good as
randomized,” making the RD design resemble the gold standard of a
classic randomized experiment.167
Following the dominant approach in the literature, 168 I measure
market reactions as cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) using an eventstudy approach.169 I use the date on which the annual-meeting vote results
165. David S. Lee & Thomas Lemieux, Regression Discontinuity Designs in
Economics, 48 J. ECON. LITERATURE 281, 281 (2010).
166. This example comes from the first introduction of RD in the 1960s. See Donald
L. Thistlethwaite & Donald T. Campbell, Regression-Discontinuity Analysis: An
Alternative to the Ex Post Facto Experiment, 51 J. EDUC. PSYCHOL. 309 (1960).
167. Lee & Lemieux, supra note 165, at 282 (internal quotation marks omitted).
168. See supra note 163.
169. For an explanation of the event-study approach, see supra Section I.B.1. To infer
that market reactions provide evidence of the socially optimal regime, one must assume
that market valuations provide unbiased estimates of the securities’ values. The ECMH
implies this proposition. See supra note 80. It is also possible that market valuations are
biased, for example toward “short-termism.” See, e.g., Lynn A. Stout, The Mechanisms
of Market Inefficiency: An Introduction to the New Finance, 28 J. CORP. L. 635, 653–55
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were disclosed on the company’s Form 8-K as the event date, with the
event window beginning the day before the filing date and ending the day
after the filing—a “((1, +1)” event window.170 Each firm’s CARs are the
difference between expected returns, which I alternatively estimate using
a market model, the Fama–French three-factor model, and the Fama–
French–Carhart four-factor model,171 and actual returns.172 These CARs
are then the outcome variable for the RD design. I use the percentage of
votes cast in favor of the proposal for the running variable,173 with fifty
percent as the cutoff point. In my baseline model, I run local linear
regressions on each side of the cutoff point, 174 following the Imbens–
Kalyanaraman approach to calculate optimal bandwidth.175 Essentially,
(2003). On the whole, the available empirical evidence does not support the shorttermism view. Mark J. Roe, Corporate Short-Termism—In the Boardroom and in the
Courtroom, 68 BUS. LAW. 977, 1005 (2013).
170. Prior research has used an event window centered around the annual-meeting
date. See, e.g., Cuñat et al., Vote Is Cast, supra note 163, at 1962 tbl.IV. Consistent with
other research on 8-K filing timing, however, I find that there is typically a delay between
the annual meeting and the date on which companies disclose the vote results. See infra
Appendix at Figure A.2 (showing a mean delay of two business days); see also Itay
Goldstein & Di Wu, Disclosure Timing, Information Asymmetry, and Stock Returns:
Evidence from 8-K Filing Texts (June 2015) (unpublished manuscript),
https://editorialexpress.com/cgi-bin/conference/download.cgi?db_name=AFA2016&
paper_id=1415 [https://perma.cc/YQZ4-PU8A].
171. Mark M. Carhart, On Persistence in Mutual Fund Performance, 52 J. FIN. 57,
61–62 (1997); Eugene F. Fama & Kenneth R. French, Common Risk Factors in the
Returns on Stocks and Bonds, 33 J. FIN. ECON. 3, 7–10 (1993).
172. I measure returns as “buy and hold” returns—the hypothetical returns an investor
would earn by purchasing the securities at the beginning of the event window and selling
them at the end of the event window.
173. I calculate this percentage out of all votes cast either “for” or “against” (i.e.,
excluding abstentions). I use this approach because this is the standard that ISS uses when
determining whether a proposal is “majority-supported.” See INSTITUTIONAL
SHAREHOLDER SERVS., U.S. PROXY VOTING POLICY PROCEDURES AND PROCEDURES
(EXCLUDING COMPENSATION RELATED): FREQUENTLY ASKED QUESTIONS 13 (Dec. 18,
2015), https://www.issgovernance.com/file/policy/us-policies-and-procedures-faq-dec2015.pdf [https://perma.cc/NN3Y-67ZA]. The ISS standard is important because ISS
may recommend voting against directors who have failed to implement a majoritysupported proposal. See id. at 17–20.
174. See generally Lee & Lemieux, supra note 165, at 319–24 (explaining this
approach).
175. See generally Guido Imbens & Karthik Kalyanaraman, Optimal Bandwidth
Choice for the Regression Discontinuity Estimator, 79 REV. ECON. STUD. 933 (2012).
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proposals that just barely pass are assigned to the treatment group,
proposals that just barely fail are assigned to the control group, and the
local average treatment effect represents the effect of a pass on
shareholder value.
Before proceeding, three caveats are in order. First, this RD design
is limited in its ability to speak to the value of proxy access for firms at
which a vote would not be a “close call.” There are essentially two
endogeneity issues here. The first involves endogeneity in the vote
outcomes. Because there may be meaningful differences between firms at
which the vote ends up “close” and firms at which the vote either succeeds
or fails by a large margin, it would be a mistake to extrapolate from close
calls to other firms. Indeed, given the significant variance in vote
outcomes, 176 it seems likely that shareholders have judged that proxy
access is well suited to some firms and ill suited to others. The second
concern involves endogeneity in the selection of firms that receive a vote
in the first place. Not only may shareholder-proponents target firms for
specific reasons, 177 but the proposals that make it to the voting stage
(instead of being settled beforehand178) may result in selection bias. Firms
that settle may very well differ systematically from firms that do not,
although the direction in which this would bias the results is unclear.179
Second, my RD design cannot speak directly to whether shareholders
value standardized terms more than nonstandard terms. That would
require something approximating a randomized experiment in which, for
176.
177.

See supra Figures 1, 3.
But see Bhandari et al., supra note 95, at 14–20 (presenting evidence that there
is a significant degree of randomness in target selection).
178. Proponents and boards frequently settle shareholder proposals before the vote
occurs. See, e.g., Sarah C. Haan, Shareholder Proposal Settlements and the Private
Ordering of Public Elections, 126 YALE L.J. 262, 277–79 (2016) (documenting
settlements in the political-spending context). Indeed, settlements have occurred for
numerous proxy access proposals. See Boardroom Accountability Project Company
Focus List, OFFICE OF THE N.Y.C. COMPTROLLER, https://comptroller.nyc.gov/services/
financial-matters/boardroom-accountability-project/focus-companies [https://perma.cc/
C7QB-PSMJ] (last visited Sept. 27, 2017).
179. On the one hand, settling firms may plausibly already have “strong” governance
in place (and therefore benefit less from proxy access), which would suggest that the
“true” average value of proxy access is less than the RD design suggests. On the other
hand, firms may settle because they predict the proposal would gain substantial support
due to their low managerial accountability and high agency costs, which would suggest
that the true average value of proxy access is higher than the RD design suggests.
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example, one compares market reactions to standardized terms with
market reactions to nonstandard terms.180 At best, my RD design speaks
to the value of standardized proxy access compared with no proxy
access—the entire package versus nothing at all.
Third, as previously mentioned, an RD design is valid insofar that
agents cannot perfectly “sort” themselves onto one side or the other of the
given cutoff point.181 Here, one might worry that some boards can gather
information about the likely vote outcome before the vote occurs and
then, with a little extra effort, swing the vote their way, for example by
lobbying major shareholders. Prior research has generally not found
evidence indicating that boards act in this way for shareholder
proposals, 182 but some more recent research suggests otherwise. 183 To
assess whether there has been sorting, I perform a McCrary density test.184
This test plots a density function for the running variable on each side of
the cutoff point, the theory being that a discontinuity around the cutoff
indicates sorting.185 The Appendix reports a graphical representation of
this test’s results. Ultimately, there does appear to be some weak evidence
of sorting, although one cannot reject the null hypothesis that there is no
sorting (p = 0.20).186 On balance, this suggests some reason for caution
when interpreting the RD results.
180. There are very few “close call” proposals that do not feature standardized terms,
so this is not possible here.
181. See supra note 167 and accompanying text.
182. See Yair Listokin, Management Always Wins the Close Ones, 10 AM. L. & ECON.
REV. 159, 174–75 (2008) (finding no discontinuity around the majority threshold for a
large sample of shareholder proposals); Cuñat et al., Vote Is Cast, supra note 163, at
1958–59 (performing a McCrary density test and finding the distribution of votes around
the cutoff is “smooth”); Flammer, supra note 163, at 2556–58 (finding no evidence of
sorting both using a McCrary density test and looking for “preexisting differences”
around the majority threshold).
183. See Laurent Bach & Daniel Metzger, Are Shareholder Votes Rigged? (Dec.
2016) (unpublished manuscript), http://www.law.nyu.edu/sites/default/files/Daniel%20
Metzger%20paper.pdf [https://perma.cc/Y2BL-95YM].
184. See generally Justin McCrary, Manipulation of the Running Variable in the
Regression Discontinuity Design: A Density Test, 142 J. ECONOMETRICS 698 (2008). I set
the cutoff point to 50, restrict the sample to BAP-style proposals for which there is no
competing management-sponsored 3/3 proposal, and include only those observations for
which stock-price data was available from CRSP.
185. Id.
186. See infra Appendix at Figure A.3.
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2. Results
With these caveats in mind, the RD design can still yield useful
insights about the market’s reception of these standardized proxy access
proposals. I therefore now turn to the results, which Table 3 reports
numerically and Figure 5 reports graphically. In my baseline estimates, I
find economically and statistically significant evidence that the market
has received the proposals favorably.187
Table 3: Regression-Discontinuity Design188
Dependent Variable

LATE
Obs.
Bandwidth
Note:

Cumulative Abnormal Returns (%)
(1)
(2)
(3)
Market Model
Fama–French
Fama–French–Carhart
3.448***
3.509***
3.346**
(1.130)
(1.329)
(1.513)
26
25
28
4.785
4.768
4.997
*p < 0.1; **p < 0.05; ***p < 0.01

As Table 3 shows, there is an economically and statistically
significant local average treatment effect across all three models. In the
first model, which uses a market model to estimate expected returns and
which effectively limits the sample to votes that fall within 4.79
percentage points of the majority threshold, the local average treatment
effect is 345 basis points. This implies that on average, a narrow “pass”
increases shareholder value by 3.45%, though the size of the standard
error gives a fairly large margin of error. In the second model, which uses
the Fama–French three-factor asset-pricing model for expected returns,
the local average treatment effect is 351 basis points. Finally, in the third
model, which uses the Fama–French asset-pricing model as extended by

187.
188.

See infra Table 3.
Coefficients represent the local average treatment effect where local linear
regressions are run on each side of the cutoff point (c = 50). Figures in parentheses are
heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors. I calculate optimal bandwidth following
Imbens and Kalyanaraman.

2017]

PROXY ACCESS AND OPTIMAL
STANDARDIZATION IN CORPORATE GOVERNANCE

225

Carhart with an additional momentum factor, the local average treatment
effect is 335 basis points.
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Figure 5: Regression-Discontinuity Design189
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The graphical representation in Figure 5 confirms the essential
results of the preceding analysis. There is a sharp discontinuity around the
majority threshold, with narrow passes producing significantly higher
CARs than narrow failures. Additionally, CARs generally hover around
zero once one moves away from the majority threshold, consistent with
the theory that the market predicts in advance vote outcomes that are not
close calls.
Skeptics might suspect that these effects are simply too large to be
accurate. Indeed, it seems hard to believe that proxy access is so
consequential that the pass of a shareholder proposal requesting proxy
access would increase shareholder value by over three percent. This
intuition underscores the importance of keeping in mind the size of the
standard errors and the wide range of possible “true” effects that might
exist. For example, the true effect for the Carhart model could very well
be two standard errors below the estimated effect (thirty-two basis points
189. The solid lines are estimates from local linear regressions run on each side of the
cutoff point (c = 50%). The dashed lines are 95% confidence intervals. Expected returns
are estimated using the Fama–French–Carhart four-factor model.
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instead of 335). This would still be economically significant, though: for
a firm with $100 billion in market capitalization, a thirty-two-basis-point
effect would imply that a narrow pass increases shareholder value by $320
million. Taking a broader view, the S&P 500 Index had a market
capitalization of $22.6 trillion as of September 29, 2017.190 Applied to the
S&P 500, a thirty-two-basis-point effect would reflect an increase in
shareholder value of over $72 billion.
However, I also run robustness checks, reported in the Appendix,
that cast doubt on the validity of my baseline results. First, and less
concerningly, in robustness checks using alternative bandwidths, the local
average treatment effect retains a positive sign, but it diminishes and loses
its statistical significance with a larger bandwidth. 191 These results,
however, are consistent with the theory that the market can at least
somewhat accurately predict and price vote outcomes that are not close
calls. Accordingly, they do not cast significant doubt on the validity of
my baseline results. Second, and more problematically, in additional
robustness checks that employ a “fuzzy” RD design 192 and alternative
inference and bandwidth-selection methodology, the estimates are even
noisier.193 Third, the results are not statistically significant in robustness
checks that employ a parametric design. 194 Overall, the failure of my
baseline results to hold up to these robustness checks—particularly those
that employ a fuzzy design—casts doubt on the internal validity of this
RD design. Thus, it is important to take the baseline results with a grain
of salt.
***
Overall, this Part has shown that standardization has been central to
the private ordering of proxy access. This standardization has surfaced
not only in the proposals presented, but also in those proposals that passed
and in the proxy access bylaws that are in effect. Moreover, regression
190. See S&P GLOBAL: S&P DOW JONES INDICES, EQUITY: S&P 500 (2017),
http://us.spindices.com/idsenhancedfactsheet/file.pdf?calcFrequency=M&force_downlo
ad=true&hostIdentifier=48190c8c-42c4-46af-8d1a-0cd5db894797&indexId=340
[https://perma.cc/Z6SC-WB8D].
191. See infra Appendix at Table A.4.
192. A fuzzy RD design accounts for the facts that majority support does not ensure
that the company will adopt proxy access, and less-than-majority support does not ensure
that the company will not adopt proxy access. See generally Lee & Lemieux, supra note
165, at 299–301.
193. See infra Appendix at Table A.5.
194. See infra Appendix at Table A.6.
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analysis of vote outcomes suggests that shareholders have preferred this
standardization—a result that should give pause to those who would decry
one-size-fits-all corporate governance. Finally, my RD design produces
evidence that the market has received these standardized proposals
favorably, though this result loses its statistical significance in robustness
checks.
IV. IMPLICATIONS FOR LAW AND POLICY
This Article has found pervasive standardization in the post–Rule
14a-11 private ordering of proxy access. Moreover, contrary to the
widespread denigration of “one-size-fits-all” corporate governance, I find
no evidence to suggest that this standardization has been harmful. In fact,
there are signs that investors have preferred standardized terms, which is
plausible on theoretical grounds. This Part explores these findings’
implications for law and policy. Section IV.A probes implications for the
merits of proxy access. Ultimately, my findings suggest that a mandatory
rule regarding proxy access would have been bad policy, although the
optimal terms of the default rule are far from clear. Section IV.B pivots
to the broader implications of my findings for the roles of standardization
and private ordering in corporate governance. Given the apparent benefits
of standardization in corporate governance, any attempt to ensure that
corporate governance structures exhibit a significant degree of
heterogeneity seems misguided. Rather, market participants appear to
choose their preferred governance structure from a limited number of
“sizes.” But even if private ordering has not avoided standardization in
corporate governance, it does appear to have helped to achieve optimal
standardization. When designing corporate governance rules, regulators
therefore might learn from this private ordering to optimize regulatory
design. Finally, Section IV.C turns to pending legislation related to
shareholder proposals and the regulation of proxy advisers. Ultimately,
my findings provide cause for concern about this legislation. First,
shareholder proposals played an important role in enabling the private
ordering of proxy access, and the evidence suggests that investors have
welcomed this private ordering (or at least have not reacted unfavorably).
This provides reason to believe that tightening the shareholder proposal
rule would impede many value-enhancing resolutions. Second, to the
extent that the increased regulation of proxy advisers is premised on these
entities’ tendency to support one-size-fits all governance, the proxy-
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adviser legislation seems both unnecessary and unlikely to achieve its
purpose.
A. THE MERITS OF PROXY ACCESS
On a basic level, my theory and findings have obvious implications
for the merits of proxy access. Given that proxy access continues to
occupy a prominent position in both academic and popular debates about
corporate law and governance, these implications should be of interest to
scholars, lawmakers, and market participants alike. This section thus
explores the implications of my theory and evidence for proxy access and
its regulation.
For lawmakers, the evidence counsels against both a mandatory rule
in favor of proxy access and a mandatory rule against proxy access. First,
shareholders’ apparent opposition to proxy access at some firms 195
implies that the imposition of mandatory proxy access across all firms—
as contemplated by the failed Rule 14a-11—would be unwise. If one
assumes that a wide-margin failure to gain majority support indicates that
proxy access would be inefficient for that firm,196 then there are numerous
firms in my sample at which proxy access would be inefficient—and this
does not even take into account the countless firms that did not receive
proxy access proposals at all (perhaps because would-be proponents
recognized that proxy access would clearly be ill suited for the firm).
Second, shareholders’ apparent appetite for proxy access suggests
that anything resembling a mandatory rule against proxy access would
also be unwise. Although it appears to be a minority position among both
scholars and practitioners, at least one commentator has continued to
advocate a return to the SEC’s old approach to Rule 14a-8(i)(8), under
which boards could exclude proposals requesting proxy access for

195. See supra Section III.A. Proxy access shareholder proposals failed to gain
majority support at numerous firms, and this result holds even if I narrow the sample to
shareholder proposals that follow the standard “BAP template,” exclude firms that
already have or are concurrently proposing proxy access bylaws, and remove insider
votes from the denominator for votes cast in favor. (These changes account for the
possibilities that idiosyncratic proposal terms, the existence of competing management
provisions, and insider ownership are driving vote outcomes.)
196. Admittedly, shareholder voting does not always lead to an efficient outcome. Cf.
Listokin, supra note 160.
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“relat[ing] ‘to an election.’”197 But given boards’ lack of incentives to
implement proxy access absent shareholder pressure—and historical
evidence showing that boards very rarely implemented proxy access prior
to the current version of Rule 14a-8(i)(8)—a return to the old Rule 14a8(i)(8) would effectively gut shareholders’ ability to bring about proxy
access via private ordering. Shareholders’ apparent acceptance of proxy
access,198 along with evidence indicating that the market has also reacted
favorably (or at least not unfavorably),199 suggests that this would be an
ill-advised course of action.
My findings also provide some support for casting proxy access as a
default rule, although it is more difficult to assess the optimal default. On
the one hand, shareholder activists’ great success in obtaining proxy
access suggests that a default rule in favor of proxy access is not
necessary. Even if a presumption that the default rule should favor proxy
access would have been wise in a prior era, 200 the private ordering of
proxy access shows this might not be necessary in the current era of
shareholder activism and powerful institutional investors. On the other
hand, if one adopts the majoritarian-preference approach to default
rules,201 the widespread adoption of proxy access may indicate that proxy
access is the majority preference, which would militate toward making
proxy access the default rule. Additionally, it is possible that many firms
have inefficiently failed to adopt proxy access—another reason to favor
proxy access as the default.202 Although most of the S&P 500 has now
adopted proxy access, there are still many smaller firms that have not done
so, presumably because they have not been targeted by shareholder
proposals. If these failures to adopt are inefficient—the product of
197. See Bernard S. Sharfman, What Theory and Empirical Evidence Tell Us About
Proxy Access, 13 J.L. ECON. & POL’Y 1, 5 (2017).
198. See supra Part III.
199. See supra Section III.D. (presenting weak evidence of a favorable market
reaction in an RD design); Bhandari et al., supra note 95, at 11–14 (presenting
economically and statistically significant evidence of positive abnormal returns for firms
targeted by the BAP announcement).
200. Cf. Lucian Ayre Bebchuk & Assaf Hamdani, Optimal Defaults for Corporate
Law Evolution, 96 NW. U. L. REV. 489 (2002) (recommending a “reversible defaults”
approach in which lawmakers favor rules that are more restrictive on management).
201. See generally FRANK EASTERBROOK & DANIEL R. FISCHER, THE ECONOMIC
STRUCTURE OF CORPORATE LAW (1991).
202. Cf. Barzuza, supra note 69 (arguing firms do not always choose their right
“size”).
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managerial agency costs and shareholders’ collective-action problems—
this would militate toward making proxy access the default. Ultimately,
the relatively widespread adoption of proxy access and possibility of an
even more widespread inefficient failure to adopt seems to suggest that a
default rule in favor of proxy access—perhaps following the current
market standard, and perhaps with a threshold exempting smaller
firms 203 —would be optimal. However, additional research would be
necessary to confirm this conclusion. And more pragmatically, it may not
be worth the political capital to push for such a regulatory change.
B. OPTIMAL STANDARDIZATION IN CORPORATE GOVERNANCE
Although the empirical portion of this Article focuses on the private
ordering of proxy access, my findings—particularly when situated in the
generalized theoretical framework developed in Part II—have important
implications beyond this narrow realm. This section places my findings
and theory in a broader context, exploring general implications for the
appropriate role of lawmakers in designing corporate governance.
1. Private Ordering, Optimal Standardization, and the Law
If nothing else, this Article shows that as a positive matter, private
ordering has not avoided the standardized corporate governance about
which critics of the SEC’s mandatory proxy access rule worried. Instead,
standardization has pervaded the private ordering of proxy access.204 But
there are also indications that as a normative matter, this standardization
may even be desirable. Regression analysis suggests that shareholders
have preferred standardization, 205 and there is weak evidence that the
market has welcomed these standardized proposals206—findings that are
consistent with Part II’s theoretical discussion of the potential benefits of
standardization. This evidence provides cause to rethink the deep-seated
narrative in corporate law scholarship and commentary that decries “one-

203. Cf. Stratmann & Verret, supra note 81 (presenting evidence of an average
negative reaction among small firms to the mandatory imposition of proxy access).
204. See supra section III.B.
205. See supra section III.C.
206. See supra section III.D.
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size-fits-all” corporate governance as inefficient for failing to recognize
firms’ heterogeneous governance needs.207
Despite the apparent benefits of standardization, however, this
Article’s findings also provide qualified support to those who would seek
to thwart a federally imposed mandate of uniform corporate governance
terms on all firms. 208 First, even if shareholders prefer some
standardization, they do not appear to prefer complete standardization.
Rather, a numerus clausus–like menu of options has emerged. Based on
the vote outcomes presented in Part III, shareholders appear to have
generally chosen either (1) proxy access on standardized terms or (2) no
proxy access at all. And for some companies, the choice seems to have
been clear. Take, for example, Genomic Health, Inc. (Genomic), whose
bylaws currently do not provide for proxy access.209 In 2016, shareholder
James McRitchie submitted a proxy access proposal to Genomic, but the
proposal failed by a significant margin—nearly fifteen percentage
points210—even though the proposal conformed to the substantive terms
of the BAP template. Genomic did not have large insider ownership211 or
other similar characteristics that one would expect to cause particularly
low shareholder support, 212 suggesting that Genomic shareholders
rationally determined that proxy access would be inefficient for the firm.
Meanwhile, at the other end of the spectrum, SciClone Pharmaceuticals,
Inc. (SciClone) shareholders expressed clear support—88% of votes
cast—for a 2016 proxy access proposal, 213 and the firm subsequently
adopted a standard 3/3/20/20 bylaw.214 Unlike Genomic, it appears that
SciClone shareholders determined that proxy access would be efficient
for the firm. These examples lend support to the view that even if the
207.
208.

See supra notes 1–9 and accompanying text; infra note 243.
Cf., e.g., Goshen & Squire, supra note 1, at 825–28 (advising against “one-sizefits-all regulations” in corporate law).
209. See Genomic Health, Inc., Definitive Proxy Statement (Form DEF 14A) (Apr.
28, 2017).
210. Data Set (on file with the author).
211. At the time of the proposal, insiders owned about 3% of the firm’s common
equity. Id.
212. See id.
213. Id.
214. See SciClone, Pharm., Inc., Amended and Restated Bylaws § 1.11 (May 9,
2017), https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/880771/000119312517164148/d39306
0dex32.htm [https://perma.cc/Z3B4-XMRY].
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optimal-heterogeneity claim is overstated, some choice appears to be
desirable. While wholesale heterogeneity may be undesirable, “limited
heterogeneity” might be efficient.215
Second, shareholders appear to have accepted at least one of the
innovations produced by private ordering: aggregation limits. Although
no shareholder proposal in my sample requested aggregation limits, firms
have adopted these limits as part of the now-market-standard 3/3/20/20
bylaw. 216 Given shareholders’ tepid response to so-called “fix-it”
proposals that would remove any aggregation limits, 217 it seems that
shareholders have accepted the limits as efficient. Indeed, this should not
be particularly surprising considering the pre–Rule 14a-11 commentary.
One of Rule 14a-11 opponents’ main concerns was the potential that
public pension funds, union funds, and other similar shareholders would
use proxy access to extract private benefits. 218 Aggregation limits
effectively force smaller-stakes shareholders to team up with large
blockholders (e.g., asset managers such as BlackRock, State Street, and
Vanguard),219 thereby reducing the risk of these conflict costs. Indeed,
this may explain the opposition of CII, an organization whose principal
constituencies are public pension and union funds, 220 to aggregation
limits.221 At the same time, however, one cannot rule out the possibility
215.
216.
217.
218.

See supra Section II.A.
See supra Section III.B.
See supra Sections III.B.–C.
See supra Section I.A. Professor Roberta Romano long ago identified public
pension funds’ capacity to extract private benefits. See Roberta Romano, Public Pension
Fund Activism in Corporate Governance Reconsidered, 93 COLUM. L. REV. 795 (1993).
219. See COUNCIL OF INSTITUTIONAL INV’RS, PROXY ACCESS: BEST PRACTICES 3
(2015), http://www.cii.org/files/publications/misc/08_05_15_Best%20Practices%20%20Proxy%20Access.pdf [http://perma.cc/GFK6-TYGT] (“[W]ithout the ability to
aggregate holdings even CII’s largest members would be unlikely to meet a 3%
ownership requirement to nominate directors. . . . [E]ven if the 20 largest public pension
funds were able to aggregate their shares they would not meet the 3% criteria at most of
the companies examined.”).
220. See Members, COUNCIL OF INSTITUTIONAL INV., http://www.cii.org/members
[https://perma.cc/4TT2-N746] (last visited Sept. 27, 2017); Council of Institutional
Investors, About Us, LINKEDIN, https://www.linkedin.com/company-beta/594217/?path
Wildcard=594217 (last visited Sept. 27, 2017).
221. See COUNCIL OF INSTITUTIONAL INV’RS, supra note 219, at 3 (“CII policies and
related public positions do not endorse limits or caps on the number of shareowners in
the nominating group.”).
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that these large blockholders have inefficiently caused the adoption of
aggregation limits to cement their own power, underscoring the need for
additional research.
This analysis also bears on a longstanding debate about the extent to
which corporate law should consist of default rules versus mandatory
rules. Overall, shareholders’ apparent desire for some choice supports the
case for default rules. At the same time, to the extent that standardization
accompanies mandatory rules, mandatory rules produce a benefit as well:
reduction in use-stage transaction costs.222 This explanation complements
other potential justifications for mandatory rules, such as the public-goods
hypothesis, 223 the innovation hypothesis, 224 and the opportunisticamendment hypothesis.225 However, some caution is in order here. Even
if mandatory rules reduce use-stage transaction costs, default rules (and
particularly “sticky” defaults) may be able to accomplish this purpose just
as effectively, and default rules avoid the costs associated with limiting
the parties’ choice. One should therefore not assume that the benefits
produced by the tendency of mandatory rules to reduce use-stage
transaction costs will necessarily exceed mandatory rules’ substantial
costs.
2. Optimizing Regulatory Design
The private ordering of proxy access also provides lessons for the
lawmakers who design corporate law’s default rules. First, the earlier
theoretical discussion reveals that there is always some sort of default rule

222. This benefit seems particularly relevant to the shareholder proposal rule, which
is one of the principal tools of would-be corporate reformers. Indeed, when the SEC
polled shareholders and companies in the late 1990s about whether it should permit
companies to develop firm-specific systems for shareholder proposals, the vast majority
of shareholders and about half of companies expressed opposition to such changes. See
Amendments to Rules of Shareholder Proposals, 62 Fed. Reg. 50,682, 50,684 n.28
(proposed Sept. 26, 1997) (codified at 17 C.F.R. pt. 240).
223. See Jeffrey N. Gordon, The Mandatory Structure of Corporate Law, 89 COLUM.
L. REV. 1549, 1567–69 (1989).
224. See id. at 1569–73.
225. See id. at 1573–85; cf. Lucian Ayre Bebchuk, Limiting Contractual Freedom in
Corporate Law: The Desirable Constraints on Charter Amendments, 102 HARV. L. REV.
1820, 1848–51 (1989).
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in place,226 which suggests the need for greater attention to the content of
these default rules. As noted in Part II, the absence of proxy access is
essentially a default rule providing for QF O 50%, while Rule 14a-11
(were it a default rule) would have provided for a default of QF O 3%.
Thus, the absence of proxy access is a regulatory choice just as much as
making a 3% ownership threshold the default would have been. 227
Particularly given the “stickiness” of default rules 228 —and the strange
convergence of market-standard proxy access around terms that closely
resemble Rule 14a-11—this insight underscores the need for greater
attention to the form that these default rules take.
Second, lawmakers should recognize that markets may be better
positioned than regulators to arrive at optimal corporate governance
terms. 229 Accordingly, to the extent that lawmakers must set default
rules—and inaction is effectively a choice to retain the status quo—
lawmakers might attempt to better harness market forces when designing
these rules. For example, in future rulemaking initiatives, the SEC might
226. Others recognized this prior to the private ordering of proxy access, see Bebchuk
& Hirst, supra note 11, at 338–39, but the real-world experience with proxy access
provides additional clarity. There are, of course, exceptions. For example, Delaware law
requires the corporate charter to specifically state some terms, which effectively forces
the parties to consciously choose a rule rather than simply accept whatever the law might
provide by default. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 102(a)(3) (West 2017) (requiring a
corporation to state its purpose); id. § 102(a)(4) (requiring a corporation to state the
number of classes of stock that the corporation may issue and the number of authorized
shares in each class).
227. This highlights the incoherence of the “regulation–deregulation” dichotomy that
has persisted in the popular press. Indeed, the distinction between “private” and “public”
provision of corporate governance is somewhat tenuous in the first place: as long as the
state provides for enforcement of a corporate governance structure, there is necessarily
government involvement in corporate governance. Cf. Robert L. Hale, Coercion and
Distribution in a Supposedly Non-Coercive State, 38 POL. SCI. Q. 470 (1923) (critiquing
the public–private distinction in the context of the common law); Katharina Pistor, A
Legal Theory of Finance, 41 J. COMP. ECON. 315, 322–23 (2013) (arguing that financial
markets ultimately exhibit public–private hybridity).
228. See Omri Ben-Shahar & John A. E. Pottow, On the Stickiness of Default Rules,
33 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 651 (2006); Yair Listokin, What Do Corporate Default Rules and
Menus Do? An Empirical Examination, 6 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 279 (2009); Brett
H. McDonnell, Sticky Defaults and Altering Rules in Corporate Law, 60 SMU L. REV.
383 (2007).
229. This relates to the longstanding debate about public versus private provision of
corporate law. See, e.g., Hadfield & Talley, supra note 37.
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attempt something resembling Grundfest’s suggestion to conduct a
randomized poll of shareholders’ preferences. 230 There is reason to
believe that markets, which have skin in the game, will arrive at better
solutions than agency decisionmakers, who risk regulatory capture and
the influence of interest-group politics. 231 The market’s apparent
acceptance of aggregation limits, which Rule 14a-11 did not include,
provides support for this view.

230.
231.

See Grundfest, supra note 1, at 366.
See generally Gary S. Becker, Pressure Groups and Political Behavior, in
CAPITALISM AND DEMOCRACY: SCHUMPETER REVISITED 120 (Richard D. Coe & Charles
K. Wilbur eds., 1985); George J. Stigler, The Theory of Economic Regulation, 2 BELL J.
ECON. & MGMT. SCI. 3 (1971). Indeed, the SEC’s decision to adopt a mandatory rule
regarding proxy access in the face of widespread academic consensus that a default rule
would be superior—even Professor Bebchuk, perhaps the staunchest proponent of
shareholder rights, supported a default rule regarding proxy access, see supra section
I.A.—could be understood as the agency having caved in to these interest-group
pressures. This understanding, though speculative, would not be surprising given the
numerous meetings that CII, public pension funds, and union funds obtained with then–
Chair Mary Schapiro and others in the agency. See, e.g., Memorandum from Kayla J.
Gillian, Deputy Chief of Staff, Office of the Chairman, Facilitating Shareholder Director
Nominations (Feb. 2, 2010), https://www.sec.gov/comments/s7-10-09/s71009-635.pdf
[https://perma.
cc/XRX6-SKXR]; Memorandum from Kayla J. Gillian, Deputy Chief of Staff, Office of
the Chairman, Facilitating Shareholder Director Nominations (Apr. 25, 2010),
https://www.sec.gov/comments/s7-10-09/s71009-651.pdf [https://perma.cc/2MV2-GN
9J]. These are the organizations that Grundfest predicted would benefit from significant
“megaphone externalities” under a mandatory proxy access regime. See supra Section
I.A. This risk of capture goes both ways: during the Bush years, the SEC acted to limit
the private ordering of proxy access, see Shareholder Proposals Relating to the Election
of Directors, Exchange Act Release No. 34-56,914, 72 Fed. Reg. 70,450 (Dec. 11, 2007)
(2008 SEC release amending Rule 14a-8(i)(8)), perhaps due to pressure from promanagement groups such as the Business Roundtable and the U.S. Chamber of
Commerce, cf. Letter from Anne M. Mulcahy, Chairman, Bus. Roundtable Corp.
Governance Task Force, to Nancy M. Morris, Sec’y, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n (Oct.
1, 2007), https://www.sec.gov/comments/s7-17-07/s71707-77.pdf [https://perma.cc/MC
R4-F6MH] (advising against amendments to Rule 14a-8 that would have permitted
shareholders to lobby for proxy access on a firm-by-firm basis). See generally Peter L.
Kahn, The Politics of Unregulation: Public Choice and Limits of Government, 75
CORNELL L. REV. 280 (1990) (criticizing many applications of public choice theory for
failing to recognize that special interests and regulatory capture can also drive decisions
not to regulate).
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C. CURRENTLY PENDING FEDERAL CORPORATE GOVERNANCE
LEGISLATION
My theory and findings also have concrete implications for the
wisdom of currently pending legislation. Specifically, the CHOICE Act,
which the House of Representatives approved this past June and now lies
before the Senate,232 contains two provisions that could radically change
the U.S. corporate governance landscape: section 844, which would
drastically restrict shareholders’ ability to use Rule 14a-8, and sections
481 through 483 (previously known as the Corporate Governance Reform
and Transparency Act233), which would impose burdensome restrictions
on proxy advisers such as ISS.234 My analysis suggests that at least some
of the premises underlying these legislative proposals are mistaken.
1. Restrictions on Shareholder Proposals
The CHOICE Act’s proposed changes to the shareholder proposal
rule are perhaps the most problematic. Section 844 of the Act would,
among other things, require the SEC to amend Rule 14a-8 to increase the
restrictions on resubmissions of proposals that failed to gain a certain
level of support 235 and make the rule’s ownership requirements
considerably more difficult to satisfy. 236 The ownership-requirement
changes are particularly troubling. Section 844 would peg minimum
ownership at one percent, eliminate shareholders’ ability to satisfy
ownership requirements through ownership of a certain dollar amount of

232. See Ryan Tracy & Rachel Witkowski, House Passes Bill Rolling Back Wall
Street Rules, WALL STREET J. (June 8, 2017), https://www.wsj.com/articles/house-set-topass-bill-rolling-back-wall-street-rules-1496914205 [https://perma.cc/BKV7-ECHC].
233. Corporate Governance Reform and Transparency Act of 2016, H.R. 5311, 114th
Cong. (2d Sess. 2016).
234. See Financial CHOICE Act of 2017, H.R. 10, 115th Cong. §§ 481–483, 844 (1st
Sess. 2017).
235. See id. § 844(a) (increasing thresholds from 3% to 6% for proposals submitted
once within the past five years, 6% to 15% for proposals submitted twice within the past
five years, and 10% to 30% for proposals submitted three times within the past five
years).
236. See id. § 844(b) (eliminating the dollar amount option to satisfy the threshold,
requiring 1% ownership at minimum, and lengthening the holding period from one to
three years).
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shares, and increase the holding period to three years237—changes that
would effectively block all retail investors and even most institutional
investors from using Rule 14a-8. But many of the successful shareholder
proposals in my sample were submitted by small-stakes shareholders,
including numerous retail investors. Indeed, out of the ten proposals in
my sample that gained the highest percentage of “for” votes—proposals
that one might presume enhance shareholder value—four were submitted
by individuals, and even the institutional proponents would have failed to
satisfy the CHOICE Act’s proposed one percent ownership threshold.238
Ultimately, section 844 would likely stop virtually all shareholders—
except large asset managers, who have traditionally not submitted
shareholder proposals anyway239—from using Rule 14a-8. Shareholder
proposals’ role in causing widespread adoption of proxy access—along
with empirical evidence from other research that indicates that
shareholder proposals play a positive role in corporate governance240—
suggests that the resulting drop in proposal volume would be undesirable.

237.
238.

Id.
Moreover, these top-ten firms’ current ownership profiles suggest there would
be very few other candidates to submit proxy access proposals. My review of FactSet
Ownership statistics indicates that as of May 5, 2017, none of the firms currently had
shareholders who had both held (1) 1% of the firm’s shares for the required three years
and (2) were present in my sample as having submitted proxy access proposals. See Data:
Ownership, supra note 137.
239. See Kahan & Rock, supra note 42, at 1375–83; cf. Gilson & Gordon, supra note
159, at 895 (characterizing these investors as “rationally reticent”).
240. See, e.g., Laurent Bach & Daniel Metzger, How Do Shareholder Proposals
Create Value? (Mar. 2017) (unpublished manuscript), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/pape
rs.cfm?abstract_id=2247084 [https://perma.cc/B438-HDE4] (employing an RD design
and finding positive abnormal returns for narrow passes); Cuñat et al., Corporate
Governance and Value, supra note 163 (employing an RD design and finding positive
value for corporate governance proposals); Cuñat et al., Vote Is Cast, supra note 163
(same); cf. Flammer, supra note 163. Although some research has failed to identify a
positive effect, this may be due to the failure of these studies to identify properly
exogenous shocks. The RD literature is much better suited to this task. See Sanjat Bhagat
& Roberta Romano, Event Studies and the Law: Part II: Empirical Studies of Corporate
Law, 4 AM. L. & ECON. REV. 380, 404–05 (2002); cf. Lee & Lemieux, supra note 165, at
281–83 (noting the advantages of RD designs).
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2. Increased Oversight of Proxy Advisers
Although the CHOICE Act’s proposal to increase oversight of proxy
advisers presents a more complicated set of issues, my analysis provides
cause for skepticism about this proposal as well. Contained in Title IV of
the CHOICE Act, the “Corporate Governance Reform and Transparency”
provisions would subject “proxy advisory firms” to significant SEC
oversight, including registration and disclosure requirements; prohibition,
management, or disclosure of conflicts of interests; and substantive
supervision of advisory-service quality. 241 Additionally, the bill would
require the SEC to direct its staff to withdraw two influential no-action
letters that permit registered investment advisers to rely on proxy
advisers’ voting recommendations for certain fiduciary-duty-related
purposes.242 Based on the bill’s legislative history, one of the underlying
justifications for this regulatory scheme appears to be proxy advisers’
alleged tendency to promote inefficient “one-size-fits[-]all” corporate
governance.243
241. Financial CHOICE Act of 2017, H.R. 10, 115th Cong. §§ 482–83 (1st Sess.
2017).
242. See id.; Egan-Jones Proxy Services, SEC No-Action Letter, Fed. Sec. L. Rep.
(CCH) ¶ 78,820 (May 27, 2004); Institutional Shareholder Services, Inc., SEC No-Action
Letter, Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) ¶ 78,845 (Sept. 15, 2004). These no-action letters address
investment advisers’ duties under Investment Advisers Act Rule 206(4)-6 to vote client
securities in the best interests of clients. See 17 C.F.R. § 275.206(4)-6 (2017). The EganJones letter essentially permits investment advisers to rely on proxy advisers’ voting
recommendations to “cleanse” the investment advisers’ conflicts of interest, subject to
due diligence requirements. See Egan-Jones Proxy Services, supra. The Institutional
Shareholder Services letter essentially permits investment advisers to rely on proxy
advisers’ written conflict-of-interest-management policies to satisfy the investment
advisers’ duty of care in connection with voting client securities. See Institutional
Shareholder Services, Inc., supra. The SEC staff synthesized these no-action letters in a
later staff legal bulletin, the basic takeaway being that investment advisers can rely on a
proxy adviser’s voting recommendations, but they cannot do so blindly—due diligence
is necessary. See SEC Staff Legal Bulletin No. 20 (IM/CF) (June 30, 2014),
https://www.sec.gov/interps/legal/cfslb20.htm [https://perma.cc/YJ7K-CCMG].
243. See Legislative Proposals to Enhance Capital Formation, Transparency, and
Regulatory Accountability: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Capital Mkts. and Gov’t
Sponsored Enters. of the H. Comm. on Fin. Servs., 114th Cong. 5 (2016) [hereinafter
May 2016 Hearing] (statement of Tom Quaadman, Senior Vice President, Ctr. for Capital
Mkts. Competitiveness of the U.S. Chamber of Commerce) (criticizing ISS and Glass
Lewis for offering “one-size-fits[-]all recommendation[s]”); see also Examining the
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This Article’s analysis undermines the one-size-fits-all critique of
proxy advisers. Even if proxy advisers have contributed to the
standardization of corporate governance, this standardization is not
necessarily undesirable. As explained in Part II, there are theoretical
reasons to suppose that some standardization serves a useful role, and
there is evidence that shareholders have in fact preferred standardization
in proxy access. 244 Granted, I did not include proxy advisers’ voting
recommendations in my regression specifications, so I cannot rule out the
possibility that these recommendations account for much of shareholders’
apparent preference for standardization. 245 But even if proxy advisers
have contributed to the standardization of proxy access, the RD design
results show that the market appears to have welcomed this standardized
proxy access.246 Moreover, other empirical research indicates that an “ISS

Market Power and Impact of Proxy Advisory Firms: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on
Capital Mkts. & Gov’t Sponsored Enters. of the H. Comm. on Fin. Servs., 113th Cong. 2
(2013) (statement of Rep. Scott Garrett, Chairman, Subcomm. on Capital Mkts. & Gov’t
Sponsored Enters.) (“[P]roxy advisory firms often make voting recommendations based
on one-size-fits-all policies and checklists that fail to take into consideration how voting
recommendations affect the actual shareholder value.”); id. at 15 (statement of Darla C.
Stuckey, Senior Vice President, Policy & Advocacy, Soc’y of Corp. Sec’ys &
Governance Prof’ls) (“[P]roxy firm reports are based on one-size-fits-all policies. This is
a problem simply because companies are not the same.”); id. at 27 (statement of Harvey
L. Pitt, Founder & CEO, Kalorama Partners, LLC) (criticizing ISS and Glass Lewis for
adopting “one-size-fits-all position[s]” on the frequency of say-on-pay votes); cf. Rose,
supra note 7, at 916–19 (criticizing proxy advisers on similar grounds).
244. See supra Part III.
245. Additionally, proxy advisers may exert influence through other channels, such
as their policies regarding director recommendations. ISS, for example, is well known
for issuing “withhold” recommendations against directors who have failed to
substantially implement majority-supported shareholder proposals. See INSTITUTIONAL
SHAREHOLDER SERVS., supra note 173, at 17–19. Indeed, ISS’s evaluation of boards’
responses to majority-supported proxy access shareholder proposals suggests that their
approval of the 3/3/20/20 template may have contributed to the template becoming
market standard. See id. at 19–20 (announcing “ISS may issue an adverse
recommendation” in director elections if the board has, after receiving a majoritysupported proxy access shareholder proposal, adopted proxy access on more stringent
terms than the shareholder proposal, but condoning the 3/3/20/20 template).
Nevertheless, my empirical analysis suggests that shareholders preferred the 3/3/20/20
template at any rate, so ISS may simply have been following its clients’ wishes.
246. See supra Section III.D.
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recommendation shifts [only] 6% to 10% of shareholder votes,”247 though
this effect may be larger for certain vote topics.248 Given the enormity of
shareholders’ apparent preference for standardization—in my preferred
regression specification, the presence of a 3/3 proposal is associated with
an additional thirty percentage points in votes cast for the proposal, and
the presence of the additional BAP-template details is associated with
another nine percentage points in favor249—this preference likely exists
independently of proxy advisers’ influence.
This is not to deny that there may be other reasons for concern about
the role of proxy advisers in corporate governance. Even if they are not
responsible for all the standardization for which critics blame them, proxy
advisers undoubtedly exercise a great deal of influence, such that they
effectively play the role of a public regulator—without being subject to
any of the administrative law safeguards that reduce the risk of arbitrary
exercise of power.250 Consistent with the privatization literature,251 this
delegation of power raises concerns about democratic legitimacy and
arbitrariness.252 Additionally, my analysis cannot shed light on whether
conflicts of interests impede proxy advisers’ ability to render impartial
advice, 253 and there is still a possibility that ISS’s voting
247. See Stephen Choi et al., The Power of Proxy Advisors: Myth or Reality?, 59
EMORY L.J. 869, 906 (2010); see also Stephen J. Choi et al., Director Elections and the
Role of Proxy Advisors, 82 S. CAL. L. REV. 649 (2009).
248. See Yonca Ertimur et al., Shareholder Votes and Proxy Advisors: Evidence from
Say on Pay, 51 J. ACCT. RES. 951, 975 tbl.6 (2013) (finding evidence of a larger impact
for say-on-pay votes); David F. Larcker et al., Outsourcing Shareholder Voting to Proxy
Advisory Firms, 58 J.L. & ECON. 173, 185 tbl.2 (2015) (same); Nadya Malenko & Yao
Shen, The Role of Proxy Advisory Firms: Evidence from a Regression-Discontinuity
Design, 29 REV. FIN. STUD. 3394, 3408 tbl.3 (2016) (same).
249. Supra Table 2.
250. Proxy advisers are not, for instance, subject to the procedural restrictions of the
Administrative Procedure Act, and updates to their voting policies are not subject to hardlook review under State Farm. See generally Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n v. State Farm
Mutual Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29 (1983).
251. See Gillian E. Metzger, Privatization as Delegation, 103 COLUM. L. REV. 1367
(2003).
252. See generally Lisa Schultz Bressman, Beyond Accountability: Arbitrariness and
Legitimacy in the Administrative State, 78 N.Y.U. L. REV. 461 (2003); Mark Seidenfeld,
A Civic Republican Justification for the Bureaucratic State, 105 HARV. L. REV. 1511,
1559–62, 1576 (1992).
253. This concern also underlies the Corporate Governance Reform and Transparency
legislation. See May 2016 Hearing, supra note 243.
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recommendations may, in some cases, lead to value-reducing corporate
changes. 254 These possibilities arguably support the case for requiring
additional disclosure from proxy advisers regardless of their alleged
tendency to promote one-size-fits-all corporate governance. Nevertheless,
to the extent that criticism of proxy advisers is premised on the one-sizefits-all critique, this criticism appears to be unwarranted (or at least
overblown).
CONCLUSION
This Article shows that, contrary to some commentators’ predictions,
standardization has pervaded the private ordering of proxy access.
Moreover, I offer evidence suggesting that shareholders actually prefer
this standardization, and I find weak evidence indicating a favorable
market reaction to this standardized proxy access regime. I also show,
based on the transaction costs that shareholders must incur to use control
rights that feature idiosyncratic terms, that shareholders’ apparent
preference for standardization in corporate governance is plausible on
theoretical grounds. These findings have important implications for law
and policy, including currently pending legislation.
The Article also leaves several remaining puzzles for future research.
To begin, why has the market adopted proxy access on terms that so
closely mirror the vacated Rule 14a-11? One possibility is that the SEC
managed to identify terms for proxy access that were very close to the
terms that the market would have independently developed—notice-andcomment rulemaking at its best. Perhaps more likely, though, is the
possibility that Rule 14a-11 served as a focal point for the private ordering
that ensued after the rule’s invalidation. Indeed, Rule 14a-11 has featured
prominently in shareholder proposals’ supporting statements, and CII’s
“best practices” guide even includes a direct comparison between market
practices and Rule 14a-11.
Second, how many firms have inefficiently failed to adopt proxy
access? Although there are thousands of public companies in the United

254. See Larcker et al., supra note 248 (presenting empirical evidence indicating that
proxy advisers’ recommendations regarding say-on-pay votes lead firms to adopt valuereducing changes to their executive-compensation packages). But see Ertimur et al.,
supra note 248 (finding no market reaction to announcements of changes to executivecompensation plans following adverse shareholder votes accompanied by negative ISS
recommendations).
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States, only a few hundred have adopted proxy access so far. It is unclear
whether this failure to adopt is largely efficient—the product of a
determination that at those firms, the principal costs produced by proxy
access would exceed any reduction in agency costs—or largely
inefficient—the product of a pernicious interaction between managerial
agency costs and shareholders’ collective-action problems.
Finally, how does standardization feature into corporate governance
in contexts other than proxy access? Although my theoretical analysis
applies to corporate governance generally, the empirical evidence
presented covers only proxy access. Future research could attempt to
determine whether my findings generalize to other contexts.
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APPENDIX
Figure A.1: BAP Template
RESOLVED: Shareholders of The AES Corporation (the “Company”) ask the board of directors (the “Board”) to adopt, and present for
shareholder approval, a “proxy access” bylaw. Such a bylaw shall require the Company to include in proxy materials prepared for a shareholder
meeting at which directors are to be elected the name, Disclosure and Statement (as defined herein) of any person nominated for election to the
board by a shareholder or group (the “Nominator”) that meets the criteria established below. The Company shall allow shareholders to vote on
such nominee on the Company’s proxy card. The number of shareholder-nominated candidates appearing in proxy materials shall not exceed one
quarter of the directors then serving. This bylaw, which shall supplement existing rights under Company bylaws, should provide that a
Nominator must:
a) have beneficially owned 3% or more of the Company’s outstanding common stock continuously for at least three years before
submitting the nomination;
b) give the Company, within the time period identified in its bylaws, written notice of the information required by the bylaws and any
Securities and Exchange Commission rules about (i) the nominee, including consent to being named in the proxy materials and to
serving as director if elected; and (ii) the Nominator, including proof it owns the required shares (the “Disclosure”); and
c) certify that (i) it will assume liability stemming from any legal or regulatory violation arising out of the Nominator’s communications
with the Company shareholders, including the Disclosure and Statement; (ii) it will comply with all applicable laws and regulations if it
uses soliciting material other than the Company’s proxy materials; and (c) to the best of its knowledge, the required shares were
acquired in the ordinary course of business and not to change or influence control at the Company.
The Nominator may submit with the Disclosure a statement not exceeding 500 words in support of the nominee (the “Statement”). The Board
shall adopt procedures for promptly resolving disputes over whether notice of a nomination was timely, whether the Disclosure and Statement
satisfy the bylaw and applicable federal regulations, and the priority to be given to multiple nominations exceeding the one-quarter limit.
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Figure A.2: Delay Between Annual Meeting and 8-K Filing255

255.

The dashed line represents the mean delay.
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Figure A.3: McCrary Density Test
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Table A.1: Coding Rubric
Term

Ownership Threshold256
Holding Period
(Years)257
Maximum Slate258
Aggregation Limits
Differential Application
Based on Size of
Nominating Group
Maximum-Ownership
Requirements
Certification
Requirements
Restrictions on Board’s
Presentation of Nominees
in Proxy Statement
Binding Bylaw
Amendment
Restrictions on Board’s
Ability to Amend Bylaw

Required Value for
“3/3” Dummy
Variable to Equal 1
3%

Required Value for
“BAP” Dummy
Variable to Equal 1
3%

3

3

—
—

25%
No

—

No

—

No

—

Yes

—

No

—

No

—

No

256. For proposals that specify different rules for different group sizes, I use the more
“general” threshold (i.e., the threshold applicable to the less restrictive group-size
requirements).
257. For proposals that specify different rules for different group sizes, I use the more
“general” threshold (i.e., the threshold applicable to the less restrictive group-size
requirements).
258. For proposals that specify different rules for different group sizes, I use the total
proportion of the board that may be elected if both groups were to nominate a candidate.
Additionally, when a maximum-slate term provides for a number that is “the greater of”
either a percentage or a number, I identify only the percentage.
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Table A.2: Variable Definitions
Variable

Source

Definition

3/3

DEF 14A

See Coding Rubric

BAP

DEF 14A

See Coding Rubric

DEF 14A

Dummy variable equal to 1 if the proxy
statement indicates that the board (1) is
concurrently proposing a 3/3 bylaw or
(2) has already adopted a 3/3 bylaw;
and 0 otherwise

Comp. (5/3)

DEF 14A

Dummy variable equal to 1 if the proxy
statement indicates that the board (1) is
concurrently proposing a 3/3 bylaw or
(2) has already adopted a 5/3 bylaw;
and 0 otherwise

Mgmt. Rec.

DEF 14A

Dummy variable equal 1 if the board
has recommended voting “for” the
proposal; and 0 otherwise

Staggered
Board

ISS259

Dummy variable equal to 1 if the firm
has a staggered board; and 0 otherwise

SM Bylaws

ISS

Dummy variable equal to 1 if the firm
has a supermajority requirement to
amend the bylaws; and 0 otherwise

SM Charter

ISS

Dummy variable equal to 1 if the firm
has a supermajority requirement to
amend the charter; and 0 otherwise

SM Mergers

ISS

Dummy variable equal to 1 if the firm
has a supermajority requirement to
approve a merger; and 0 otherwise

Golden
Parachute

ISS

Dummy variable equal to 1 if the firm
has a golden parachute; and 0 otherwise

Poison Pill

ISS

Dummy variable equal to 1 if the firm
has a poison pill; and 0 otherwise

Comp. (3/3)

259.

The year for all ISS variables is equal to the year of the annual meeting, except
where that data was not available yet, in which case the variables correspond to the most
recent year for which data was available.
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Cumulative
Voting

ISS

Dummy variable equal to 1 if the firm
has cumulative voting; and 0 otherwise

Majority
Voting

ISS

Dummy variable equal to 1 if the firm
has majority voting; and 0 otherwise

Board
Independence

ISS

`U)C@X '? 7(A@%@(A@(V ;.X@BV'XW
['VD+ `U)C@X '? ;.X@BV'XW
T 100

CEO Duality

ISS

Dummy variable equal to 1 if the CEO
is also the chairman of the board; and 0
otherwise

Boys’ Club

ISS

Dummy variable equal to 1 if the fewer
than 10% of the firm’s directors are
women; and 0 otherwise

Insider
Ownership

FactSet260

\/DX@W _R(@A CP "7(W.A@XW"
T 100
['VD+ \/DX@W _UVWVD(A.(>

Institutional
Ownership

FactSet

\/DX@W _R(@A CP 7(WV. 138 8.+@XW
['VD+ \/DX@W _UVWVD(A.(>
T 100

Number of
Blockholders

FactSet

The number of shareholders that own at
least 1% of the firm’s common equity

Say-on-Pay
Vote
(Same
Meeting)

FactSet

Y'V@W "8'X" ^DP ^DB,D>@
Y'V@W "8'X" M Y'V@W "L>D.(WV"
T 100

Market
Capitalization

FactSet

2(4^X.B@ T \/DX@W _UVWVD(A.(>3

ROA
(Winsorized at
95%)

FactSet

_%@XDV.(> 7(B')@
T 100
['VD+ LWW@VW

Operating
Margin
(Winsorized at
95%)

FactSet

_%@XDV.(> 7(B')@
T 100
]@S@(U@

260.

FactSet ownership variables are calculated as of the most recently available Form
13F data prior to the annual meeting, FactSet financial statement data are calculated as
of the end of the fiscal year preceding the annual meeting, and FactSet proponent-type
and sector data are drawn from Shark Repellent for the annual meeting.
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PTB Ratio
(Winsorized at
95%)

FactSet

^X.B@ T \/DX@W _UVWVD(A.(>
J'', YD+U@ '? I'))'( 9$U.VP

Leverage
(Winsorized at
95%)

FactSet

['VD+ ;@CV
['VD+ LWW@VW

R&D

FactSet

]&; \%@(A.(>
T 100
]@S@(U@

EPS Growth

FactSet

Dummy variable equal to 1 if EPS grew
from the prior year; and 0 otherwise

CRSP

The annualized CAPM alpha for the
500 trading days preceding the
company’s annual meeting (up to the
day before the meeting), benchmarking
against a value-weighted index

Proponent
Type

FactSet

Categorical variable corresponding to
the “type” of proponent (e.g.,
individual, public pension fund,
investment adviser, etc.); I manually
reclassified all proponents in the “Other
Stake Holders” category

Industry

FactSet

Categorical variable corresponding to
the firm’s “sector”

Year

FactSet

The year of the annual meeting

CAPM Alpha
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Table A.3: Summary Statistics261
Statistic

N

Mean

St. Dev.

Min

Max

Votes Cast in Favor (%) 213

48.799

20.856

3.192

98.087

Majority Supported
(Dummy)

213

0.498

0.501

0

1

BAP-Style Proposal
(Dummy)

213

0.793

0.406

0

1

3/3 Proposal (Dummy)

213

0.887

0.317

0

1

No-Action Letter Sought
213
(Dummy)

0.225

0.419

0

1

Binding Bylaw
Amendment (Dummy)

213

0.038

0.191

0

1

Ownership Threshold
(%)

213

2.800

0.586

1

3

Holding Period (Years)

213

2.845

0.465

1

3

Maximum Slate (%)

213

26.934

9.016

20

100

Group Size Differences
(Dummy)

213

0.089

0.286

0

1

Maximum Ownership
(Dummy)

213

0.042

0.202

0

1

Certification
213
Requirements (Dummy)

0.840

0.367

0

1

Presentation
213
Requirements (Dummy)

0.117

0.323

0

1

Binding Bylaw
Amendment (Dummy)

213

0.038

0.191

0

1

Amendment Restrictions
213
(Dummy)

0.009

0.097

0

1

Dueling 3/3 Proposal
(Dummy)

213

0.023

0.152

0

1

Mgmt. Rec. (Dummy)

213

0.028

0.166

0

1

261. This table presents summary statistics for all shareholder proposals in the
sample, excluding dual-class firms.
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Dueling 5/3 Proposal
(Dummy)

251

213

0.056

0.231

0

1

Preexisting 3/3 Proposal
213
(Dummy)

0.113

0.317

0

1

Preexisting 5/3 Proposal
213
(Dummy)

0.056

0.231

0

1

Staggered Board
(Dummy)

174

0.190

0.393

0

1

SM Bylaws (Dummy)

174

0.305

0.462

0

1

SM Charter (Dummy)

174

0.397

0.491

0

1

SM Mergers (Dummy)

174

0.149

0.358

0

1

Golden Parachute
(Dummy)

174

0.736

0.442

0

1

Poison Pill (Dummy)

174

0.057

0.233

0

1

Cumulative Voting
(Dummy)

174

0.029

0.168

0

1

Majority Voting
(Dummy)

174

0.810

0.393

0

1

Board Independence (%) 174

82.281

9.219

50

93.75

CEO Duality (Dummy)

174

0.448

0.499

0

1

Boys’ Club (Dummy)

174

0.132

0.340

0

1

Institutional Ownership
(%)

213

78.803

22.135

5.783

100

Insider Ownership (%)

212

6.138

11.092

0.003

66.272

Number of Blockholders 213

16.216

6.125

0

32

Say-on-Pay Vote (%)

213

88.013

13.768

22.6

99.8

Market Capitalization
(Millions)

212 42,180.44

88,819.88

2.43

639,938.8

Assets (Millions)

212 85,794.13 301,801.20

2.599

2,225,494

Sales (Millions)

212 24,568.94

54,878.77

4.459

485,651

ROA (%)

212

8.347

6.990

(3.736

23.044

Operating Margin (%)

212

14.938

12.526

(11.662

37.320

PTB Ratio

202

3.792

3.464

0.828

14.053

Leverage

212

0.286

0.185

0

0.676
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R&D (as % of Sales)

212

0.045

0.131

(0.255

0.393

EPS Growth (Dummy)

213

0.540

0.500

0

1

CAPM Alpha (%)

206

0.639

19.905

(68.692

97.784
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Table A.4: RD Robustness Checks (Alternate Bandwidths)262
Market Model
Dependent Variable
Cumulative Abnormal Returns (%)
(2)
(3)
(4)

(1)
LATE
Obs.
Bandwidth

(5)

3.448***
(1.130)

2.617*
(1.455)

2.260
(1.569)

1.869
(1.632)

0.477
(1.555)

26
4.785

33
5.5

36
6.0

42
6.5

59
9.569

Note:

*p < 0.1; **p < 0.05; ***p < 0.01

Fama–French
Dependent Variable

LATE
Obs.
Bandwidth

Cumulative Abnormal Returns (%)
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
3.509***
2.794*
2.478
2.099
(1.329)
(1.692)
(1.817)
(1.869)
25
4.768

33
5.5

Note:

36
6.0

42
6.5

(5)
0.753
(1.737)
59
9.536

*p < 0.1; **p < 0.05; ***p < 0.01

Fama–French–Carhart
Dependent Variable
(1)
LATE
Obs.
Bandwidth
Note:

Cumulative Abnormal Returns (%)
(2)
(3)
(4)

(5)

3.346**
(1.513)

2.681
(1.797)

2.280
(1.931)

1.874
(1.986)

0.436
(1.759)

28
4.997

33
5.5

36
6.0

42
6.5

60
9.995

*p < 0.1; **p < 0.05; ***p < 0.01

262. These robustness checks use the same methodology as my baseline models but
add specifications with alternate bandwidths: 5.5, 6.0, 6.5, and double the Imbens–
Kalyanaraman optimal bandwidth.
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Table A.5: RD Robustness Checks (Fuzzy Design)263
Market Model
Dependent Variable
Cumulative Abnormal Returns (%)
LATE
Method

(1)

(2)

(3)

26.889

18.775

18.775

(46.334)

(46.334)

(65.888)

Conventional

Bias-Corrected

Robust

Note:

*p < 0.1; **p < 0.05; ***p < 0.01

Fama–French
Dependent Variable
Cumulative Abnormal Returns (%)
LATE
Method

(1)

(2)

(3)

18.058

13.676

13.676

(27.992)

(27.992)

(38.259)

Conventional

Bias-Corrected

Robust

Note:

*p < 0.1; **p < 0.05; ***p < 0.01

Fama–French–Carhart
Dependent Variable
Cumulative Abnormal Returns (%)
(1)
LATE
Method
Note:

(2)

(3)

14.317

11.396

11.396

(26.653)

(26.653)

(35.326)

Conventional

Bias-Corrected

Robust

*p < 0.1; **p < 0.05; ***p < 0.01

263. These robustness checks employ a fuzzy RD design with robust bias-corrected
inference and bandwidth-selection procedures following Sebastian Calonico et al.,
Robust Nonparametric Confidence Intervals for Regression Discontinuity Designs, 82
ECONOMETRICA 2295 (2014).
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Table A.6: RD Robustness Checks (Parametric)264
“Close Calls” Only
Dependent Variable
Cumulative Abnormal Returns (%)
(1)

(2)

(3)

Market Model

Fama–French

Fama–French–Carhart

0.072

0.390

0.247

(1.552)

(1.712)

(1.749)

Obs.

28

28

28

Bandwidth

5.0

5.0

5.0

Pass

Note:

*p < 0.1; **p < 0.05; ***p < 0.01

Full Sample
Dependent Variable
Cumulative Abnormal Returns (%)

Pass
Obs.
Bandwidth
Note:

(1)

(2)

(3)

Market Model

Fama–French

Fama–French–Carhart

0.516

0.503

0.472

(0.580)

(0.569)

(0.559)

135

135

135

Full Sample

Full Sample

Full Sample

*p < 0.1; **p < 0.05; ***p < 0.01

264. In these robustness checks, I run simple OLS regressions in the form IL] O = M
;N M H* M &, where ; is a dummy variable equal 1 if the proposal gained at least fifty
percent of the vote and H is the percentage of votes cast in favor. N is thus the treatment
effect (“Pass” in the table). Figures in parentheses are heteroskedasticity-robust standard
errors.

